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FISHERY CONSERVATION:
IS THE CATEGORICAL EXCLUSION OF
FOREIGN FLEETS
THE NEXT STEP?
Pressure is building for what may be the most significant
fishery legislation since the enactment of the Fishery Conservation

and Management Act of 1976 (FCMA).' In the midst of the
FCMA's failure to reduce substantially the amount of foreign fishing in the United States' 200-mile fishery conservation zone,2 legislation was introduced that would require a complete phase-out of
foreign fishing.3 The enactment of such a measure would have substantial implications in international law and would be a unilateral
action unique in the history of United States' law of the sea policy.4
The sea's fishery resources always have been a vital source of
food. The realization that these resources are finite and exploitable

beyond the point of self-renewal has come to pass only within the
last eighty years.' The Truman Proclamations6 of 1945 recognized
the need for a system of conservation and management to prevent
the depletion of these fishery resources off the coast of the United
States. Lesser-developed countries followed by claiming jurisdiction to 200-mile territorial seas and exclusive economic zones
(EEZ)7 to protect their offshore resources, but the United States re1. Pub. L. No. 94-265, 90 Stat. 331 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1976)). H.R.
200, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), passed the House by a vote of 208 to 101 on October 9,
1975, and passed the Senate in lieu of S. 961, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), on January 28,
1976. The Act went into effect on March 1, 1977.
2. Fishery conservation zone as defined by the Fishery Conservation and Management
Act is found in 16 U.S.C. § 1801 (1976):
There is established a zone contiguous to the territorial sea of the United States to
be known as the fishery conservation zone. The inner boundary of the fishery conservation zone is a line coterminous with the seaward boundary of each of the
coastal States, and the outer boundary of such zone is a line drawn in such a manner that each point on it is 200 nautical miles from the baseline from which the
territorial sea is measured.
3. See the latest such proposal of this nature in Title III of House Bill H.R. 7039, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) [hereinafter cited as House Bill]. See Bill in the form that House of
Representatives passed in 126 CONG. REc. H9389-94 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1980) [hereinafter
cited as CONG. REc.]; see also H.R. REP. No. 1138, Part 1, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) [hereinafter cited as House Report]; Wall St. J., Sept. 24, 1980, at 12, col. 1.
4. See notes 268-334 47fra, and accompanying text.
5. D. JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FISHERIES 3 (1965).
6. See notes 51-65 infra, and accompanying text.
7. A functional zone in which coastal states claim exclusive rights to exploit all living
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frained from such extended claims. The United States eventually
became disenchanted with the ineffectiveness of its treaty agreements to regulate foreign fishing off its shores and with the slow
pace of United Nations negotiations; its response was one of the
most significant unilateral actions in the previous two hundred year
history of the law of the sea.'
In 1976 the United States Congress enacted the FCMA, claiming jurisdiction to a 200-mile Fisheries Conservation Zone (FCZ).
The two main objectives of the Act were to promote the interests of
the United States fishing industry9 and to conserve and manage the
fishery resources in United States coastal waters.'° Both objectives
hinged on strictly regulating the amount of foreign fishing within
the FCZ.I" After four years and two amendments to the FCMA, I2
foreign fishing in the FCZ has not been substantially reduced.' 3
Foreign fleets are harvesting over sixty-five per cent of the fishery
resources within the United States' 200-mile exclusive economic
zone while the United States continues to import over one-half of
its seafood needs from foreign companies.' 4 Major violations of
foreign fishing regulations are seriously hampering effective conservation and management measures. 15 Thus, the objectives of the
FCMA remain largely unfulfilled.
In response to these unfulfilled expectations, legislation' 6 was
introduced on April 15, 1980, which, inter alia, would establish a
and non-living resources within a zone having a seaward limit of 200 nautical miles from the
baselines used to measure the territorial sea. R. ECKERT, THE ENCLOSURE OF OCEAN RESOURCES 30 (1979).

8. Secretary of Commerce, Juanita M. Kreps, described the new statute as "by far the
most significant marine fishery legislation in our history." 1977 DIG. U.S. PRAC. INT'L L.
543.
9. 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(3) (1976).
10. Id. § 1801(b)(l).
11. See id. § 1821.
12. Pub. L. No. 95-354, 1978 Amendment; Pub. L. No. 96-61, 1979 Amendment.
13. See notes 200-03 infra, and accompanying text.

14. H.R. REP. No. 445, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1975). In 1950 the United States imported only 23.4 per cent of its seafood while in 1974 imports were over 60 per cent. See also

[1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 604, 605.
15. See notes 237-45 Mfra, and accompanying text.
16. Known as the American Fisheries Promotion Act, H.R. 7039 (supra note 3) was
introduced on April 15, 1980, by Mr. Breaux, Mr. Murphy of New York and Mr. Forsythe.
The Bill provides for comprehensive research and development regarding United States
fisheries, to expand the fishing vessel and fish processing capacity of the United States and
establish a program to phase-out foreign fishing vessels from waters under United States
fishery management jurisdiction. This Comment focuses on Title III, Amendments to the
Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, specifically § 301, Phase-out of Foreign
Fishing. See House Report, supra note 3.
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phase-out mechanism for foreign fishing within the United States'
FCZ. In May of 1980, hearings were held and an overwhelming
majority of the testimony presented was in strong support of the
legislation.' 7 Subsequently, a modified version of the original Bill
passed the United States House of Representatives in September of
1980. The Bill that was finally enacted into law on December, 22,
1980, the American Fisheries Promotion Act, did not incorporate
the mandatory phase-out mechanism of the original Bill.' 8 But, in
view of the serious attention being given to the construction and
implementation of a phase-out program and the continuation of the
antecedents that prompted the proposal, it is necessary to examine
the phase-out concept and its implications in international law. Economic necessity and preservation of United States offshore resources may yet provide the impetus for the enactment of such a
measure.
This Comment suggests that the enactment of a mandatory
phase-out program categorically excluding foreign nations from the
United States' FCZ may be a flagrant violation of international
law. The historical background of jurisdictional zone claims is reviewed, showing that the present proposals for phasing-out foreign
fishing are not novel. The successful attempt of the first United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea to partially codify extended fisheries jurisdiction in international law is examined. It is
then shown that the failures of the second and third Conferences to
draft a treaty acceptable to all nations helped provide the impetus
for unilateral action. Following this discussion, the FCMA and the
events leading to its enactment are examined to show that the Act's
failure to fufill its original objectives has provided the atmosphere
for the proposal of a more extreme measure of phasing-out foreign
fishing. Finally, this Comment discusses whether there is a need
for such a measure in the light of the protective provisions already
embodied in the FCMA. Possible violations of both international
law, especially treaties, and of emerging international law are also
House Report, supra note 3, at 14-15.
18. American Fisheries Promotion Act, Pub. L. No. 95-561, § 201, 94 Stat. 3287 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as the Promotion Act]. This Act is Title II of the Salmon and Steelhead
Conservation and Enhancement Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-561, § 101, 94 Stat. 3275 (1980).
This reference to the American Fisheries Promotion Act is only to a single section of the Act,
§ 230, which amends § 1821(d) of the FCMA. Although the phase-out mechanism was not
incorporated into the Promotion Act amendment, political and economic factors will undoubtedly raise again the issue of categorically excluding foreign fleets from the United
States FCZ.
17.
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examined. Justification for enforcement of such a measure is discussed as well as the likely international response to such an action.
I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF JURISDICTIONAL ZONES

A.

Initial Development of JurisdictionalZones

The principle of the freedom of the high seas 9 is a stable concept that has been recognized in the international law of the sea
since the time of Grotius.20 Since the mid-twentieth century, fundamental changes have occurred, not in the concept of the high sea
as res communis,2 1 but in the degree to which coastal States have
19. This principle has been stated in slightly different terms at different times. Lord
Stowell, in the case of Le Louir (2 Dods. 210, 243 (1817)) summed up the principle in one
sentence: "[A1ll nations have an equal right to the unapportioned parts of the ocean for their
navigation .... " Cf.(Judge Story's opinion in The MariananFlora) (I Wheaton 1,43
(1826)): Upon the ocean, in time of peace, all possess an entire equality. It is the common
highway of all, appropriated to the use of all, and no one can vindicate to himself a superior
or exclusive perogative there." C. COLOMBos, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 54 (3d
rev. ed. 1954).
The International Law Association expressed the principle in Article 13 of the Laws of
Maritime Jurisdictionin the Time of Peace adopted at its Vienna Conference in 1926, thusly:
"no state or group of states may claim any right of sovereignty privilege or perogative over
any portion of the high seas or place any obstacle to the full and free use of the seas." 34th
Report, at 101 et seq.
The modem legal position on the freedom of the high seas was synthesized by the Institute of International Law at its Lausanne Conference in 1927 in a Declaration declaring that:
"The principle of the freedom of the sea implies specifically the following consequences:
(i) freedom of navigation on the high seas, subject to the exclusive control, inthe absence of
a convention to the contrary, of the state whose flag is carried by the vessel; (ii) freedom of
fisheries on the high seas subject to the same control; (iii) freedom to lay submarine cables
on the high seas; (iv) freedom of aerial circulation over the high seas." 33 ANNUAIRE 339
(1927).
The most recent codification of this principle of international law is the Convention on
the High Seas, produced at the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea in
1958. It embodies, intera/ia, the same four basic consequences mentioned in the Declaration
by the Institute of International Law in 1927. See Article 2, Convention on the High Seas,
done at Geneva, April 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (1962).
See also 4 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 501-603 (1965) for a history of
the freedom of the high seas, and J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 194 (6th ed. 1963).
20. The celebrated Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius is generally regarded as the "Father of
International Law." History crowned him with this title due to this treatise, DEJURE BELLI
AC PACIS, published in 1625. By the end of the seventeenth century this treatise was generally considered as embodying the rules of international law. See VREELAND, HUGO GROTIUS: THE FATHER OF THE MODERN SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1917); DE PAUW,

GROTIUS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA (1965); C. COLOMBOS, supra note 19, at 8.
21. Res communis (a thing common to all) is the doctrine that the sea is incapable of
effective occupation. This is the view supported by Grotius. See C. COLOMROS, supra note
19, at 52. See also GARCIA-AMADOR, THE EXPLOITATION AND CONSERVATION OF THE RESOURCES OF THE SEA 16-17 (2d ed. 1959). Cf.(the property of no one) res nu/lins, signifying
that the sea is capable of ownership. C. COLOMBOS, supra note 19, at 55.
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extended their coastal jurisdiction seaward into areas previously
considered to be high sea. The boundary line delimiting jurisdictional zone claims has been moved further and further out to sea
and with it the historical freedoms associated with the high seas
have been removed further from land areas.2 2
The freedom that has been historically regarded as a funda-

mental principle of the high seas emerged in its modem form from
23

the famous Grotius-Seldin debate of the seventeenth century.
The debate sprang from the confficting views of the Dutch and
English as to a State's right to the use of the ocean for trade with
the East Indies. Hugo Grotius, a seventeenth century Dutch jurist,
produced the treatise, Mare Librum ,24 in defense of the right of the
Dutch to the free use of the oceans to participate in this trade. John
Seldin responded with Mare Clausum ,25 articulating the English
position that the seas were capable of appropriation and thus could
come under national control. The debate was long and heated, but
the Grotian view ultimately prevailed.2 6
By the end of the seventeenth century, claims to vast expanses
of ocean no longer had international recognition in law or practice.2 Jurisdictional claims to ocean space, however, were soon to

take a new form - the territorial sea.2 8
22. Cf. (when that extended jurisdiction constitutes a territorial sea) E. JONES, LAW OF
THE SEA: OCEANIc RESOURCES 63-64 (1972), for the view that extending the breadth of the
territorial sea constitutes a process of encroachment upon the internationally sanctioned doctrine of res communis which endangers the future status of the freedom of the seas; W.
FRIEDMAN, THE FUTURE OF THE OCEANS 43-44 (1971), for the view that any extension of
jurisdiction beyond the three mile territorial sea constitutes an infringement on the freedom
of the seas. Friedman states that "[i]n the perspective of the Grotian Doctrine of the fredom
of the seas, an extension of territorial waters from the now generally accepted maximum of
12 miles to 200 miles is a disaster, turning us back three and one-half centuries to Seldin's
doctrine [see notes 23-26 infra, and accompanying text] of the closed sea."
23. For an account of this debate see G. KNIGHT, THE LAW OF THE SEA: CASES, DoCuMENTS, AND READINGS 13-22 (1978); E. JONES, LAW OF THE SEA: OCEANIC RESOURCES 7-

13 (1972).
24. MARE LIBRUM was written in 1604 and published in 1609. It forms the twelfth
chapter of Grotius' work DE JURE PRAEDAE, which was published only in 1868. C.
COLOMBOS, supra note 19, at 52. See MARE LIBRUM (R. Magoffin trans. 1916).
25. MARE CLAUSUM was an exhaustive reply in two books to Hugo Grotius' MARE
LIBRUM. It appeared in 1816 but was not published until 1635. C. COLOMBOS, supra note
19, at 53.
26. The debate continued with unabated persistence into the eighteenth and nineteenth
centuries. See T. FULTON, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE SEA 377 (1911).
27. L. HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW 307 (1980).

28. See J. BRIERLY, supra note 19, at 195. For a definition of territorial waters see
COLOMBOS, supra note 19, at 67. For a complete discussion of the territorial sea see 4 M.
WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-417 (1965); Fenn, Origins of the Theory of
TerritorialWaters, 20 AM. J. INT'L L. 465 (1926).
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In the early eighteenth century States began exerting jurisdiction over areas of adjacent ocean waters.29 Bynkershoer, a Dutch
jurist, was the first to advance a "cannon shot" rule, a theory that
claimed that a State's dominion extended out to sea only so far as
its cannons would reach.3" This theory did not involve a continuous belt of waters, but merely constructed zones or "pockets" of
adjacent sea limited to the range and location of the cannons on
shore.3 ' Some years later the Italian writer Galiani explicitly stated
a more practical and definite territorial sea doctrine. Rather than
have the neutrality of particular waters depend on the capricious
placement of cannons on adjacent shores, Galiani proposed a continuous belt of territorial sea extending from the shores of the littoral State3 2 three marine miles out to sea. 33 Galiani's view
prevailed, and by the end of the nineteenth century, a three mile
wide territorial sea was, with few exceptions, worldwide.3 4
The early part of the twentieth century saw States asserting
jurisdiction into territorial seas expanded to six and twelve miles.35
These practices were generally considered incompatible with accepted rules of international law in the first half of the twentieth
century. 36 By 1958, however, only twenty coastal States out of seventy-three were adherents to the three mile rule. 37 The remainder
of States claimed ocean areas greater than three miles from their
coasts. To date no limit of the breadth of the territorial sea has
been agreed upon by a majority of States.3 But it is now clear that
a claim larger than three miles is no longer, ipsofacto, contrary to
29. See E. JONES, SUPra note 23, at 56-60 for an account of the origins and development
of the three mile territorial sea.
30. Walker, Territorial Waters.- The Cannon Shot Rule, 12 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 210
(1945).
31. Id. at 212.
32. Littoral means belonging to the shore. Littoral States are coastal States with some
part of their border touching the ocean.
33. See note 30 supra, at 228-29.
34. The notable exceptions were: the Scandanavian countries claiming four miles, Russia claiming three to twelve miles at different times, and Spain and Portugal claiming six
miles each. L. HENKIN, supra note 27, at 308.
35. At the time of the Hague Conference in 1930 less than one-fifth (8 of 38) of the
coastal States claimed territorial waters over the three mile limit. No plenary assertions of
jurisdiction beyond three miles by these states apparently were exercised in the first thirty
years of the twentieth century. See Sorensen, National Sovereignty Over the MarginalSea,
520 INT'L CONC. 242 (1958).
36. Heingen, The Three Mile Limit.- Preserving the Freedom of the Seas, II STAN. L.
REV. 639 (1959). See also Note, 23 COLUM. L. REV. 472 (1923).
37. 4 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 17; J. BRIERLY, SUpra note 19,
at 207.
38. Both the Hague Conference and the 1958 United Nations Conference on the Law of
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international law.39
The International Law Commission has formulated the proposition that "international law does not permit an extension of the
A three mile territorial sea
territorial sea beyond twelve miles."'
may now be considered customary international law, but such a
claim to a breadth greater than 12 miles would not be sanctioned
by international law.4 ' Whether the 12 mile territorial sea is now
accepted as customary international law is still a bone of contention. Some authorities claim that a 12 mile territorial sea is international law, 42 and in terms of State's practice, the marked trend in
the last twenty years from a three mile breadth to a twelve mile
breadth would at least indicate it is developing customary international law. 43 "International legal scholars, however, still differ on
the question whether a twelve mile breadth is now sanctioned by
customary international law."'
Extra-territorial contiguous zones 45 of numerous types4 6 have
been created to deal with special ocean jurisdiction problems, such
as high seas fisheries,47 that could not adequately fit into the framework of the doctrine of the high seas or the concept of the territorial
sea.4 8 These ocean zones of limited jurisdiction, contiguous to the
territorial sea, are by definition generally regarded as not extending
the Sea (UNCLOS) at Geneva failed to solve the problem of the breadth of the territorial
sea. See J. BRIERLY, mupra note 19, at 202-11.
39. J. BRIERLY, supra note 19, at 206-07.
40. This proposition was formulated by the International Law Commission in the immediate aftermath of the 1948 Truman Proclamations (see note 51 infra) which provided
impetus for extended Latin American claims to the exclusive rights to all the resources of the
seas over their continental shelf. See J. BRIERLY, supra note 19, at 207.
41. G. KNIGHT, supra note 23, at 7-39.
42. See Statement made by the representatiave of Mexico in the Sea-Bed Committee at
UNCLOS that "there is a sufficient international consensus of opinion for the twelve mile
limit of the territorial sea to be regarded as Customary International Law." U.N. Doc. A/
Ac. 138/SC. II/SR. 11 (1971).
43. Over three times as many States (60 States) now claim a breadth of 12 miles as their
territorial sea than any other claim except for three miles. Since the time of the first United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea there is a marked trend toward a 12-mile territorial sea claim. G. KNIGHT, supra note 23, at 7-39.
44. Id. at 12-60.
45. Contiguous Zone is defined as part of the high seas constituting a belt outside the
territorial sea over which a state claims limited jurisdiction for the protection of specific
national interest. A Fisheries Conservation Zone (FCZ) is one of the most important contiguous zones. G. SCHWARZENBERGER & E. BROWN, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 553
(6th ed. 1976).
46. See G. KNIGHT, supra note 23, at 79-124.
47. G. KNIGHST, supra note 23, at 4-1.
48. Id.
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more than twelve miles beyond the territorial sea.49 The evolution
and debate over 3, 6, and 12 mile territorial seas, however, pales in
comparison to the 200-mile functional zone concept 50 which
emerged in the middle of the twentieth century.
49. Article 24 of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone states
that:
I. In a zone of the high seas contiguous to its territorial sea, the coastal state may
exercise the control necessary to:
(a) Prevent Infrin$ement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary regulations
within its territory or territorial sea;
(b) Punish infringement of the above regulations committed within its territory or
territorial sea.
2. The contiguous zone may not extend beyond twelve miles from the baseline from
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.
3. Where the coasts of two states are opposite or adjacent to each other, neither of the
two states is entitled, failing agreement between them to the contrary, to extend its contiguous zone beyond the median line every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points on the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial seas of the two states
is measured.
50. "The purpose of claiming a functional zone, whether it is called 'exclusive economic
zone,' 'epicontinental sea,' 'exclusive fishery zone,' 'conservation zone' or 'patrimonial sea' is
to exercise concrete functional jurisdiction over the resources of an area adjacent to the territorial sea normally of up to 200 miles from the coast .. " A. SZEKELY, LATIN AMERICA
AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF THE SEA 88-93 (1976).
The following illustration provides a simplified overview of basic jurisdictional zones
established in ocean space through treaties or by the evolution of customary international
law principles.

Baseline

3 Miles

12 Miles

200 Meter

200 Mile

Isobath

Limit

~Territo ial S oo
Exclusive Fisheries Zone

Upland

Proposed Economic Resource Zone

High Seas

i

I

K.

G. KNIGHT, MANAGING THE SEAS LIVING-RE.SOURCES

20 (1977).
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The Beginnings of 200-Mile Zones

The Truman Proclamations 5 of 1945 gave birth to the concept
of 200-mile zones.5 2 The Proclamations ushered in a new era of
high seas jurisdiction 53 which would eventually lead to such ex54
treme claims as 200-mile territorial seas.
The two Proclamations were largely a response to advancing
technological development5 5 allowing for greater and more efficient
exploitation of the seas' resources as well as the prospect of
overfishing. 56 The value of fish stocks in offshore waters and the
second Proclamation, the "Fisheries Proclamation," provided the
authority, through a unilateral claim to the regulation and control
of a designated conservation zone, 57 by which the United States
could enclose that resource under its exclusive control.
The Fisheries Proclamation was misinterpreted, however, by
several nations that subsequently made extended unilateral claims
to offshore resources.5 8 These nations assumed the Proclamation
51. Two Proclamations were issued on September 28, 1945: (1) Presidential Proclamation No. 2667, often called the "Truman Continental Shelf Proclamation," which stated
United States policy regarding the natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf, and (2) Presidential Proclamation No. 2668 often called the 'Truman Fisheries
Proclamation," which stated United States policy with respect to coastal fisheries in certain
areas of the high seas. Of significance is that this second Proclamation came with corresponding Executive Order No. 9634, providing for the establishment of a fisheries conservation zone. See 13 DEP'T STATE BULL. 487 (1945). For an examination of the impact of these
Proclamations on subsequent Latin American claims see generally A. SZEKELY, supra note
50.
52. The first and many subsequent claims to 200-mile zones expressly as well as impliedly relied on the precedent set by the Truman Proclamations. For an examination of the
impact of these Proclamations on subsequent Latin American claims see A. SZEKELY, supra
note 50. See also Hollick, The Truman Proclamations, 17 VIRG. J. INT'L L. 23, 55 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Truman Proclamations].
53. Selak, Recent Developments in High Seas FisheriesJurisdictionunder the Presidential
Proclamationof 1945 44 AM. J. INT'L L. 670 (1950). See Truman Proclamations,supra note
52, at 55, stating that the Proclamations set the stage for subsequent claims.
54. Hollick, The Origins of 200-Mile Zones 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 494 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Origins of 2OO-Aile Zones]. As of 1978, fourteen States have claimed 200-mile territorial seas. These are: Argentina, Benin, Brazil, Congo, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ghana,
Guinea, Liberia, Panama, Peru, Sierra Leone, Somalia and Uruguay. See also Truman Proclamations, supra note 52, at 55.
55. After World War II the increasing use of the diesel engine at sea, and the introduction of new chilling and freezing techniques, enabled fishing fleets to range over greater
distances from home ports. Truman Proclamations,supra note 52, at 55.
56. Id. It is also important to note that a motivating purpose behind the Truman Proclamation was conservation and arose out of the incursion of Japanese fishing fleets into the
Alaska Bristol Bay red salmon fishery. H.R. REP. No. 445, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1975).
57. See second Truman Proclamation, No. 2668, reprintedin 13 DEP'T STATE BULL. 448
(1945).
58. In 1945, Mexico proclaimed jurisdiction over the continental shelf and established a
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meant that the United States would accept the extension of their
sovereignty over the high seas off their coasts.5 9 This idea apparently developed because it was thought that the second Proclamation set up conservation zones in the high seas which were to be
administered by the United States.' This notion was not the case.
The official United States interpretation of the Fisheries Proclama-

tion was that the President "might set up zones in the high seas in
order to conserve fisheries without regard to the limitations of territorial waters."'" In fact this action was never taken. The practical
consequences of the Fisheries Proclamation was not to change existing international law but to affirm it.62 Nevertheless, the Truman
Proclamations set the stage for all subsequent national 200-mile

claims.63
C. The First 200-Mile Claims
On June 23, 1947, relying on the Truman Proclamations as
precendent,'6 Chile took the lead in extending a unilateral claim to
the first 200-mile zone in history.6 5 Peru soon followed as did

Costa Rica, El Salvador and Honduras. A gold rush fever reaction
fishery conservation zone. In 1946, Argentina claimed not only the shelf and its resources,
but also the superjacent waters, while Panama made a similar claim. The following year,
Chile and Peru took steps toward establishing an EEZ by claiming national sovereignty 200
miles seaward for the purposes of preserving and exploiting their "patrimonial" resources.
Krueger & Nordquist, The Evolution ofthe 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone.- State Practice
in the Pacoc Basin, 19 VIRG. J. INT'L L. 321, 326 (1978).
59. This is the opinion of Senator Green, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee's Subcommittee. Text of statement reprintedin 44 AM. J. INT'L L. 680 (1950).

60. T. WOLFE, PERUVIAN-UNITED

STATES RELATIONS OVER MARITIME FISHING: 1945-

1969; Occasional Paper No. 4, Law of the Sea Institute, 1-8, 14-16 (1970), reprintedin G.
KNIGHT, .su.pra note 23, at 710.
61. This was the interpretation given by Dr. W.M. Chapman, spokesman for the Department of State. 20 DEP'T STATE BULL. 71 (1949) (emphasis added). See also Selak, Recent Developments in High Seas FisheriesJurisdiction Under the PresidentialProclamationsof
1945, 44 AM. J. INT'L L. 680 n.49 (1950). Apparently only such an interpretation would be
consistent with the position of the United States at that time of "[reserving] the rights and
interests of the United States so far as it concerns any effects..." of the decree in question
(referring to United States non-recognition of the first exclusive 200-mile claims made by
Chile in 1947 in reliance on the Truman Proclamations as precedent). Complete text of the
note sent by the United States to Chile is reprintedin 44 AM. J. INT'L L. 674 (1950).
62. Id. The view expressed by W.M. Chapman, spokesman for the Department of
State.
63. Truman Proclamations,supra note 52, at 55.
64. The Truman Proclamations are not only cited as precedent, but also reflected in the
text of the Chilean claim. See Origins of 200-Mile Zones, supra note 54.
65. United Nations Legislative series, Laws and Regulations on the Regime of the High
Seas, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/1, at 6 (1951); 4 M. WHrrTEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 794-96 (1965).
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had begun and the lesser-developed countries, especially in Latin
America, became a hotbed for such extended claims. From this
movement sprang the second landmark in "200-mile zone" history
- the Declaration of Santiago.66 It was signed by Chile, Peru and
Ecuador in 195267 and was the first multilateral declaration of a
200-mile zone.6 8 It proclaimed that each country possessed "sovereignty and jurisdiction over the area of the sea adjacent to the coast
of its own country and extending not less than 200 nautical
miles."6 9 Its effect was to legitimize and give credibility to one of
the newest and most extreme concepts ever advanced in the international law of the sea.70
But, the trilateral Declaration of Santiago was insufficient to
elevate the 200-mile zone to the status of broadly applicable international law." Although the Declaration evidenced the three signatories' idea of what the law should be, it did not as a treaty
evidence customary international law. A prime requirement for the
establishment of international law by custom is "evidence of a general practice accepted as law." 7 2 The lack of State practice and recognition of a 200-mile unilateral claim, as well as the fact that only
three lesser-developed countries had declared, by treaty, their position on the law at this time, failed to give the 200-mile zone concept
the status of international law. The United Nations Conferences
on the Law of the Sea made the first concerted effort to reach agreement on and codify through multilateral conventions the 200-mile
zone and other aspects of the international law of the sea.7 3
66. Laws and regulations on the Regime of the Territorial Sea, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/
SER.B/6, at 723 (1956).
67. Agreements between Chile, Ecuador and Peru, signed at the First Conference on the
Exploitation and Conservation of the Maritime Resources of the South Pacific, Santiago,
August 28, 1952, Declaration on the Maritime Zone, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 135/REV. 1, at I I12 (1968).
68. Lynch, The Nepal Proposalfora Common Heritage Fund- Panaceaor Popedream?,
10 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 25, 29 (1980).
69. U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/6, at 723-24 (1957).
70. Lynch, supra note 68, at 29.
71. Article 38(l)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice lists as a source of
international law "the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations." 59 Stat.
1055, T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1179; signed at San Francisco on June 26, 1945; entered intoforce on
October 24, 1945 [hereinafter cited as Statute of the I.C.J.]. All members of the United Nations are i6sofacto parties to the Statute (see Charter of the United Nations, 59 Stat. 1031,
T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1153, art. 93). Liechtenstein, San Marino and Switzerland also are parties.
72. Id. art. 38(l)(b).
73. See Dean, The Second Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sex The Fightfor
Freedom of the Seas, 54 AM. J. IN'L L. 751, 769 (1960).
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D.

United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea

The United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea (UNreflect an attempt to establish some international uni-

CLOS) 74

formity and agreement among nations in the area of the law of the
sea. 7 Rapid change in ocean politics, use and technology have injected into the Conferences the realization that customary international law is inadequate to deal with these problems. 76 Thus,
UNCLOS has set itself to the task of writing a global charter based
on the theme, "the common heritage of mankind. ' 77 Due to the
multifarious interests of the member nations,7 8 however, agreement
on anything but broad generalities has remained elusive.79
At the time of the convening of the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I) in 1958,80 only a halfdozen States8 ' had asserted some form of 200-mile claim. Though
the breadth of any exclusive fishery zone was a major issue, 200mile zones,per se, were not a major focus of discussion, since there
was little support for such claims.8 2 It would remain for UNCLOS
III and its global educational effects to help the 200-mile Exclusive
Economic Zone gain acceptance in international practice.83
The importance of UNCLOS I lies in the four Conventions
74. The first UNCLOS met in Geneva from February 24 to April 28, 1958. The second
UNCLOS met in Geneva from March 17 to April 27, 1960. The third UNCLOS convened
in 1974 and is still in session.
75. For example, at UNCLOS I, the four Conventions; at UNCLOS III, the Negotiating Text. This attempt is also reflected in John Norton Moores' statement at UNCLOS III
that "the Conference is writing a global charter for an area of approximately three-quarters
of the surface of the earth." See Proceedings LOS Institute, Ninth Annual Conference, January 6-9, 1957; CHRISTY, LAW OF THE SEA: CARACAS AND BEYOND 4-5 (1975).

76. Id. at 5. The fact is, however, that because of the failure by member nations to
agree on any proposals of international significance, the UNCLOS continue to lag behind
customary international law.
77. Id. at 5, 26.
78. Id. at 19. In 1970 the United Nations General Assembly adopted the "Declaration
of Principles," stating that the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, together with
its resources is the "common heritage of mankind." Declaration of Principles, G.A. REs.
2749, 25 U.N. GAOR, (Supp. No. 28) 24, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970). See also Ambassador
Pardo's "Common Heritage" speech to the United Nations General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/
6695 (1967); U.N. Doc. A/C.l/p.v, at 1515-16 (1967).
79. Some broad areas of general consensus, however, were outlined in a commentary on
the Ninth Conference of UNCLOS III by John N. Moore. Id. at 14-15.
80. UNCLOS I met for its first session in Geneva on February 27, 1958. These include
Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras and Panama.
81. These include Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras and Panama.
82. D. BoWETT,THE LAW OF THE SEA 5-12 (1967); Gutteridge, Beyond the 3-Mile Limit:
Recent Developments Affecting the Law of the Sea, 14 VIRO. J. Iwr'L L. 195, 198 (1973).
83. Krueger & Nordquist, supra note 58, at 329.
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adopted by the Conference - the Convention on the Territorial
Sea and Contiguous Zone,8 4 the Convention on the High Seas,8 5
the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas8 6 and the Convention on the Continental
Shelf.8 7 The first two Conventions - on the territorial seas and the
high seas - were largely codifications of existing customary international law.88 The latter two Conventions - on fishing and the
continental shelf - explored new area.8 9 The Conventions laid an
important foundation for latter developments in the 200-mile zone
beyond the territorial sea. By piecing together certain provisions of
the Conventions, the beginnings of a general fishery zone beyond
the territorial sea emerge.
From Article 24 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and
Contiguous Zone9' comes a codified explication of the contiguous
zone. This Article allows the coastal State to exercise the control
necessary to prevent infringements of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary regulations in a twelve mile zone contiguous to its
territorial sea. 9 ' The Convention does not, however, expressly provide for any control over fishery resources in this contiguous zone.
The Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas9 2 fills this gap, to an extent, by recognizing
a coastal State's "special interest in the maintenance of the productivity of the living resources in any area of the high seas adjacent to
its territorial sea."9 3 The Convention also provides for the unilateral adoption of "measures of conservation appropriate to any
stock of fish or other marine resources in any area of the high seas
84. Done at Geneva, April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S.
205 (1964) [hereinafter cited as the Territorial Seas Convention].
85. Done at Geneva, April 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82
(1962) [hereinafter cited as the High Seas Convention].
86. Done at Geneva, April 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5669, 559 U.N.T.S. 82
(1966) [hereinafter cited as the Fishing Convention].
87. Done at Geneva, April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311
(1964) [hereinafter cited as the Continental Shelf Convention].
88. Gutteridge, supra note 82, at 196. For example, the Convention on the High Seas is
a codification of the views of Grotius. See notes 24-25 supra, and accompanying text. The
Convention on the Territorial Seas, though setting no breadth, was a codification of the
customary international law of the territorial waters. See notes 39-44 supra, and accompanying text.
89. Id. at 196.
90. See Territorial Seas Convention, supra note 84, art. 24.
91. Id.
92. See Fishing Convention, supra note 86.
93. Id. art. 6.
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adjacent to its territorial sea. . . ."'I It should be noted, however,
that this Convention was not designed to give exclusive fishing
rights to the coastal State, for any conservation measures were to be
applied without discrimination and with the aim of securing the
"optimum sustainable yield" 5 so as to secure a "maximum supply
of food and other marine products." 96
Perhaps more important to later developments of extended jurisdictional zones was the recognition in the Convention on the
Continental Shelf 7 that "[t]he coastal State exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and
exploiting its natural resources." 9 Though this Convention left the
extent of such jurisdiction uncertain and did not, by definition, deal
with the fishery resources in the marine layer, 99 its importance is
that it recognized, as did the Convention on the Territorial Sea and
Contiguous Zone,1 00 two extensions of national jurisdiction beyond
the territorial sea.' 0 '
Out of all three of the Conferences on the Law of the Sea, the
four Conventions produced at UNCLOS I are, to date, the only
codified principles of international law accepted by a significant
number of States 0 2 regarding jurisdictional zones beyond the territorial sea.' 03 Thus, taken as a whole, these Conventions come as
close as anything yet formulated to a codification of international
law regarding extended fisheries jurisdiction."
For all its successful and far reaching codification of much of
94. Id. art. 7.
95. Id art. 2. For a discussion of the concept of optimum yield see text accompanying
notes 258-64 infra.
96. Id
97. See Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 87.
98. Id. The Continental Shelf is referred to as "[tihe seabed and subsoil of the submarine area adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200
metres or beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superadjacent waters admits of the
exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas." Id. art. 1.See also Gutteridge, supra
note 82, at 197.
99. Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 87, art. 1.
100. Id.

101. Gutteridge, supra note 82, at 197.
102. Over forty-five States are parties to these Treaty Conventions including all the major powers such as the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, Canada and
Japan.
103. The Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea (informal text), the latest UNCLOS
negotiating text has yet to be adopted by any country. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.I0/Rev.
3/Add. 1 (1980). See also G. KNIGHT,CONSEQUENCES OF NON-AGREEMENT AT THE THIRD
U.N. LAW OF THE SEA CONFERENCE (1976).
104. D. BOWETT, supra note 82, at 11.
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the law of the sea," °5 UNCLOS I left unresolved the two crucial
issues of the breadth of the territorial sea and the breadth of exclusive fishery zones." ° This failure made a second Conference on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS II) in 1960 necessary, for the incompleteness of the 1958 codification was obvious. 0 7 The two questions remained unsettled, however, for UNCLOS II also failed to
08
produce an agreed solution to these problems.'

The significance of UNCLOS II, in regard to extended fishery

jurisdiction, was the occurrence of the first notable proposal" 9 for
an exclusive contiguous fishery zone subject to a ten-year phasing-

out period.l"0 The United States and Canada, backed by the West-

ern Powers, jointly sponsored a proposal"' for a six-mile territorial
sea and a six-mile contiguous fishery zone extending six miles beyond. Existing fishing rights within this exclusive 12-mile contiguous zone were to be preserved for a limited period of ten years." 2
"This was felt to be the minimum period in which the long range
fishing States could either seek for alternative fishing grounds on
the high seas or, if this was not possible, make the necessary economic adjustments so as to cushion the effects of the stoppage of
large sections of their fishing industry." 3 This so-called "six-plussix" formula" 14 failed by one vote to achieve the two-thirds majority necessary for adoption."15 This formula is the closest any proposal for an exclusive fishery zone has come to codification in
international law."16
After the failure of UNCLOS II, countries' began negotiating agreements reflecting the influence of the six-plus-six formula
105. Id. at 5.
106. Id See also Jessup, 7he Law of the Sea Around Us, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 104 (1961);
Jessup, The U.N.Conferences on the Law of the Sea, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 234 (1959).
107. D. BowETT,supra note 82, at 5.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 11.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. The six-plus-six formula was a proposal whereby there would be an inner zone of
six miles of territorial waters and an outer zone of a further six miles in which more-or-less
exclusive fishery rights would be conferred on the coastal State. BOwETT,supra note 82, at
11.
115. A two-thirds vote is required. The proposal received 54 yeas, 24 nays, with 5 abstentions. D. BowETr, supra note 82, at 11.
116. Comment, FisheriesJurisdictionBeyond the TerritorialSea - with Special Reference
to the Policy of the United States, 44 WASH. L. REV. 307 (1968).
117. United Kingdom, Norway and Iceland. D. BowETT,supra note 82, at 14.
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(in regard to fisheries) and in particular the notion that historic
rights should not exist in perpetuity, but should be phased-out
gradually.' 1 8 The most notable agreement, the European Fisheries
Convention,' 1 9 was produced at the European Fisheries Conference
of 1964.120 Fourteen countries 12 1 agreed to a six-plus-six formula
with phase-out provisions. A notable departure, however, from the
Geneva proposal was the phase-out of historic fishing rights in relation to the inner six miles and not the outer six miles of the 12-mile
zone. 22 In the outer six these rights were considered permanent,
thus upholding traditional fishing rights. Nevertheless, the phasing-out of fishing rights in exclusive fishery zones, though at this
time concerned only with a 12-mile continguous zone, was being
discussed and formulated as early as 1960.
Not until UNCLOS III did 200-mile exclusive economic zones
begin to receive serious attention from the United Nations and gain
acceptance in international practice. 123 Recognition in a multilateral treaty of an exclusive economic zone may eventually emerge
from UNCLOS 111.124 At present, however, negotiations are moving at a less than expedient pace. This combined with the failure
among member States to reach any significant agreement has provided an impetus for the United States to take unilateral steps to
protect its interests in the oceans. The FCMA of 1976 was such a
step.
II.

THE FISHERY CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT

ACT OF

A.

1976

Events Precedingthe Adoption of the Act

As early as the seventeenth century, the "exclusive right of the
inhabitants of a country to the fisheries along their coasts"'' 25 was
118. Id. at 14.
119. Reprinted in 3 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 469 (1964).
120. The European Fisheries Convention met from December 1963 to March 1964 and
was attended by sixteen States. D. BowETr, supra note 82, at 15.
121. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland,
Itialy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and
Northern Ireland.
122. D. BOWETT, supra note 82, at 17.
123. See generally CHRISTY, CLINGAN, GAMBLE, LAW OF THE SEA: CARACAS AND BEYOND (1975).

124. See id. at 8.
125. William Wellwood (1578-1622) writing in 1613. See C. COLOMBOS, supra note 19,

at 110. It is noteworthy that this statement refers to the territorial waters only.
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recognized as a principle of international law. 2 6 The United States
codified this principle with the enactment of the Coasting and Fishing Act in 1793.127
The Act was implemented mainly for the purpose of licensing
foreign flag vessels involved in the coasting trade or fisheries and
only indirectly prohibited foreign fishing within the territorial waters of the United States. 28 For the next 150 years the United
States did little to impose restraints on foreign fishing in any waters
off its coasts. Even the Truman Proclamations, though having
great precedent setting effect in the international sphere,129 did little
to formulate concrete sanctioned law to prohibit foreign fishing
within United States waters.
The Bartlett Act 3 ' of 1964 was the first comprehensive program, including sanctions, 13 ' which prohibited foreign fishing in
the coastal waters of the United States. The Act was in fact the
domestic implementation by the United States of Article 2 of the
Convention on the Continental Shelf produced at Geneva in
1958.132 The Act prohibited foreign fishing within three nautical
miles of the coast of the United States and the taking of continental
shelf resources. 133 The Exclusive Fisheries Zone Act 1 34 of 1966
amended the Bartlett Act by increasing the sanctions and establishing a fisheries zone, nine nautical miles contiguous to the territorial
126. It was recognized that within territorial waters, a State could enact regulations reserving to its nationals the right of fishing. See C. COLOMBOS, supra note 19, at 110.
127. The Act was also known as the Nicholson Act. 46 U.S.C. § 251(c) (1970) corresponds to the Coasting and Fishing Act of 1973, § i, 1 Stat. 305. Cf. (limited to Alaska)
Alien Fishing Act, 34 Stat. 263 (1906).
128. See 4 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 936-37 (1965). Also note
that the lack of any sanctions in this statute generally prevented any federal prosecution for
violations.
129. Origins of 200-Mile Zones, supra note 54, and accompanying text.
130. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1085 (1976). Signed into law by President Johnson on May 20,
1964. See also 4 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 936-38 (1965). Note that
this Act was repealed as of March 1, 1977, by § 402(b) of the FCMA. See note I supra. The
FCMA incorporates the essential provisions of the Bartlett Act for the United States' 200mile exclusive fishery zone. G. KNIGHT, THE LAW OF THE SEA: CASES, DOCUMENTS AND
READINGS 701(a) (1980).
131. Any person found to be in violation of this law could be fined $10,000 or imprisoned
for not more than one year and forfeit their vessel and its catch. See 16 U.S.C. § 1082 (1976).
132. See Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 87, and accompanying text.
133. See 16 U.S.C. § 1801-1885 (1976).
134. Id. § 1091-1094 (1976). Note that this Act was repealed as of March 1, 1977, by
§ 402(a) of the FCMA. The Act reads in part: "There is established a fisheries zone contiguous to the territorial sea of the United States [extending 9 nautical miles out to sea from the
territorial sea]. The United states will exercise the same exclusive rights in respect to fisheries
" Id. § 1091.
in the zone as it has in its territorial sea ....
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sea of the United States, in which the United States "exercises the
as it has in its terrisame exclusive rights in respect to fisheries.
torial sea.""'
Eventually even this 12-mile contiguous zone 136 became ineffective to conserve and manage United States' fish stock 137 and protect the United States' fishing industry from competition with
foreign fishermen. 138 Overfishing in distant waters by foreign
fishermen also depleted valuable fishery resources adjacent to the
shores of the United States. 139 The relevant statistics are revealing.
In comparison to the total annual world landings of fish, which
have tripled from 1938, from approximately 50 billion pounds to
over 150 billion pounds, the United States landings increased only
slightly, from 4.3 to 4.7 billion pounds from 1938 to 1973.1"
United States' consumption had increased only slightly less dramatically than the total annual world catch.' 4 ' The result was that
the difference between United States' catch and consumption represented imported fish, much of which was taken from waters adjacent to the United States. 142 Thus, though the volume of fish
the increase was
caught off the coast of the United States increased,
143
mainly attributable to foreign fishing efforts.
The efficiency and mobility of foreign fishing fleets, combined
with their introduction of processing vessels at sea, have led to severe overfishing off the shores of the United States. 144 Overexploitation of fishery resources is no longer a theoretical possibility
but an actual occurrence.' 4 5 In an effort to find solutions to the
problem, fishery management scientists and biologists began examining the high seas fishery as a classic common property resource.
This examination led to the conclusion that a common prop135. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1091-1094 (1976).
136. See note 134 supra.
137. Magnuson, The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976.: First Step Toward Improved Management of Marine Fisheries, 52 WASH. L. REV. 427, 431 (1977).
138. Id. Magnuson reported inhis article that foreign vessels take nearly 70 per cent of
the commercial catch of the United States coastal fisheries.
139. See generaly id.
140. Id.at 431.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 432. At the time of the Congressional debate on the FCMA, sixteen species of
fish were judged by United States scientists to be overfished off the shores of the United
States.
145. See G. KNIGHT, MANAGING THE SEAS LIVING RESOURCES 1 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as MANAGING THE SEAS RESOURCES].
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erty resource left unregulated becomes subject to the "tragedy of
the commons."' 46 The thesis of the tragedy of the commons is that
freely exploitable resources common to all will eventually be run
down to the point of destruction. 47 The logic of this theory is ideally illustrated with the high
seas fishery - a paradigm of a com48

mon property resource.1
Solutions to the tragedy of the commons immediately spring to
mind. One solution might be to create private ownership rights in
the high seas fisheries. Thus, when the carrying capacity of a
fishery is reached, the negative impact or burden on the fishery will
exceed the benefit of increased catch and one will have the incentive not to overfish.' 49 The most feasible solution, however, is: re50
striction of entry into the fishery.1
Imposing a regime of restrictions on a resource that has been
historically regarded as public property requires some governmental entity endowed with jurisdiction over the particular area of the
ocean and fishery resource concerned.'-' So far, legal and political
developments have not led to the creation of an entity that would
effectively control and manage fish stocks. Another approach to
the fishery conservation and management problem has been treaties.
Treaties, in which nations agree among themselves to restrict
146. In a now classic article entitled The Tragedy ofthe Commons, Garret Hardin was
one of the first to propose a theory for the breakdown of a common property resource, which
he termed the "tragedy of the commons." See SCIENCE, Dec. 13, 1968, at 1243.
147. Id. at 1244-45.
148. The concept of the freedom of the high seas and the now outmoded belief that the
resources of the oceans are inexhaustible has led to the characterization of the high seas
fishery as a common property resource. See MANAGING THE SEAS RESOURCES, SUpra note
145, at 4.
Before the twentieth century, neither the science nor the technology was available to
allow any significant depletion of the fishery resources of the oceans. Fisherman could take
as many fish as they were capable of without destroying the commons. Thus, it was to the
benefit of each fisherman to maximize his catch. This was the logic of the commons.
By the twentieth century, science and technology had made it possible to overfish or
exceed the carrying capacity of a fishery. At this point the inherent logic of the commons
degenerates. Tragedy is the result. In the short run, it is to the advantage of each fisherman
to maximize his catch, regardless of the affect it will have on the common fishery, since he
will experience a full unit of benefit but only a fraction of the burden imposed on the commons by such action. Consequently, "[Elach man is locked into a system that compells him
to increase his [catch] without limit - in a world that is limited." Id. at 1244. In such a
situation, the carrying capacity of the fishery is soon exceeded and the inevitable result is the
destruction of the commons. Thus, "freedom in a commons brings ruin to all." Id.
149. MANAGING THE SEAS RESOURCES, supra note 145, at 4.

150. D. JOHNSTON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FISHERIES 50-60 (1965).
151.

MANAGING THE SEAS RESOURCES, ipra note 145, at 4.
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their fishing in certain fisheries for the common good, have pro52
vided only a partial solution to the fishery management problem. 1
The major defect of a system of conservation and management by
treaty is that nations not choosing to be a party to the treaty have
no responsibility, under the customary international law principle
of the freedom of the sea, to restrict themselves voluntarily from
overfishing. Since an effective system of conservation and management depends on the group participation of all nations utilizing the
fisheries, the treaty system immediately breaks down. 153
The United Nations Conferences have tried to conciliate the
varying interests of nations and achieve a draft treaty to which all
or most nations would agree. So far this attempt has failed. The
ineffectiveness of these different solutions to terminate or prevent
overfishing and the slow pace of United Nations negotiations have
created the atmosphere for unilateral action. To conserve and
manage its fishery resources, the United States took such an action,
with the adoption of the Fishery Conservation and Management
Act of 1976.
B.

The Fishery Conservation andManagement Act as Enacted

On April 13, 1976, President Ford signed into law the Fishery
1 The effect of the
Conservation and Management Act (FCMA). 54
Act was to extend national fishery management jurisdiction to 200
nautical miles over all fish except highly migratory species.' 5 5 The
premises for adopting the FCMA were two: (1) to conserve and be
able to manage better fishery resources in United States coastal wa(2) to aid the development of
ters and prevent overfishing; 5 6 and,
57
the United States fishing industry.'
The FCMA is organized in four titles. Title 1158 states the authority of the United States for fishery management. It establishes
a zone contiguous to the territorial sea of the United States, extending 200 miles seaward from its coast, known as the Fishery
Conservation Zone (FCZ).I5 9 Title I also exempts all highly migra152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See note 1 supra.
155. Magnuson, supra note 137, at 427. The term "highly migratory species" means species of tuna which, in the course of their life cycle, spawn and migrate over great distances in
waters of the ocean. 16 U.S.C. § 1802(14) (1976).
156. 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(1) (1976).
157. Id. § 1801(bX6).
158. Id §§ 1811-1813.
159. Id § 1811.
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tory species of tuna from the fishery management authority of the
United States. 6 '
Title II of the Act authorizes foreign fishing within the FCZ if
there was an existing international fishery agreement at the time the
Act was signed into law or if the country desiring to fish within the
FCZ enters into a Governing International Fishery Agreement
(GIFA) with the United States.161 Under either case, the requirement of securing a permit from the Secretary of State to fish within
the FCZ must be met.' 62 The Secretary is authorized to charge rea63
sonable fees for these permits.
Title III establishes regional fishery management councils" 6
and national standards for fishery conservation and management.' 65 This Title also sets forth a framework for implementation
of the fishery management plans 166 and sanctions 167 for violations.
Title IV of the Act provides authority to amend the regulations
to conform to any treaty the United States might ratify as a result of
the third United Nations Law of the Sea Conference. 168 This title
gives the Act the character of an interim measure until an
accepta69
ble comprehensive international agreement is reached.'
Whether the United States has internationally-sanctioned authority to exercise jurisdiction over a 200-mile zone depends on
whether such claims are accepted as international law. In the absence of conventional regulations, such as international conventions (treaties), 7 0 the most important source of international law is
custom.171 International legal custom is defined by consistent and
uniform usage which States are obliged to follow because of a general feeling that a sanction will be imposed upon them if they do
not. 72 "Evidence that a custom in this sense exists in the international sphere can be found only by examining the practice of
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id §§ 1813 & 1802(14).
Id § 1821(b) & (c).
Id § 1824.
Id § 1824(10).
Id § 1852.
Id § 1851.
Id § 1821-1857.
Id § 1858-1860.
Id § 1881.
Magnuson, supra note 137, at 438.
See Statute of the I.C.J., supra note 71, art. 38(1)(a).

171. Fleischer, The Right to a 200-Mile Exclusive Economic Zone or a Special Fishery
Zone, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 548, 570 (1977).
172. Lauterpacht, Sovereignty Over SubmarineAreas, 27 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 393 (1950).
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states" '73 to see whether the alleged custom shows "a general practice accepted as law."' 74 Thus, a State making a claim that an international law exists must show that the alleged rule of
international law "is in accordance with a175constant and uniform
usage practiced by the States in question."'
When the United States claimed jurisdiction to a 200-mile
FCZ, twenty-five countries had already made some sort of 200-mile
claim - generally as an EEZ or as a territorial sea. 76 It is clear
that in the creation of customary international law "what matters is
not so much the number of states participating in its creation and
the length of period within that change takes place, as the relative
importance, in any particular sphere, of states inaugurating that
change . . ..
Prior to the United States' 200-mile claim in 1976 only lesserdeveloped countries, economically and politically weak, had made
such claims. In 1976, developed countries joined the 200-mile
group. Included in this assemblage were Canada, the United
States, the United Kingdom, France, the Soviet Union, Norway,
Mexico and the European Economic Community, followed soon
after by Japan. Considering the economic and political prominence of the developed countries that have asserted some form of
200-mile claim, the evidence may now exist for at least giving 200mile claims the status of developing customary international 78 law
if not developed customary international law. 179 Senator
Magnuson, principal draftsmen of the FCMA, has stated that the
United States' 200-mile claim "played a key role in establishing
[the 200-mile claim as] a customary rule of international law in a
relatively short period of time."' 80
The criticism that can be levied against construing 200-mile
claims as customary international law today is minor in comparison
to the strong evidence supporting such a claim. One such criticism
would be that the wide variance of rights claimed within the zones
prevents any real uniformity - a necessary element for customary
international law. Another criticism is the sharp protests that en173. Id.

174. Statute of the I.C.J., supra note 71, art. 38(1)(b).
175. Asylum Case (Colombia v. Peru) [1956] I.C.J. 266; J. BRIRLY, supra note 19, at
276.
176. Lynch, supra note 68, at 33.
177. Lauterpacht, supra note 172, at 394.

178. Fleischer, supra note 171.
179. Magnuson, supra note 137.
180. Id. at 427.
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sued from the United States' 200-mile claim, especially from Japan
and the Soviet Union. 18 Vehement protests usually indicate that
the protesting State does not accept as law, or as being in conformity with existing law, the practice of another State.' 82 With these
protesting States' subsequent adoptions of 200-mile zones, however,
the effect was to nullify the protests and implicitly ratify the United
States' action.
Initially, the FCMA accomplished its major goals.' 83 The
number of fishing vessels within the FCZ was reduced by onehalf."8 The United States' fleet expanded its catch of popular species and its fish catch grew. For example, the United States' cod
catch increased by 50 per cent, and the haddock catch increased by
100 per cent. 185 Development in other areas of the United States
fishing industry occurred in response to the fishermen's new found
wealth.I 6 Foreign fishing interests, however, soon found their way
around the FCMA.
C. Disappointmentsin the Aftermath of the FCMA
1. The United States Fishing Industry. The overall performance of the fishing industry since the enactment of the FCMA has
been discouraging.' 87 The United States fishermen have not seen
the preferential access 88 guaranteed to them by the FCMA produce any substantial economic growth or net increase in harvest
over the foreign fisherman.' 8 9 The reduction in foreign fishing
since the enactment of the FCMA has not been substantially re181. Japan declared its "regrets ... over the recent enactment of the FCMA of 1976
." and declared the Act could not be "deemed valid under international law." Note from
the Embassy of Japan to the United States Department of State (April 15, 1976) reprinted in
G. KNIGHT, supra note 130, at 741(n).

182. Lauterpacht, supra note 172, at 395.
183. See notes 156-57 supra, and accompanying text.
184. Wash. Post, Aug. 21, 1977, § A, at 1, col. 4.
185. Id.
186. For example, boat builders and fish processors expanded their operations. Id.
187. House Report, supra note 3, at 17.
188. 16 U.S.C. § 1821(d) (1976).
189. Table I shows the volume and value of harvests by United States and foreign
fishemen in the FCZ in the years, 1976-1979. Clearly the growth of the harvest has been
quite slow. House Report, supra note 3, at 17.
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0 More than three years after the enactment of the FCMA,
duced. 19
United States fishing fleets were harvesting only 33 per cent by volume, and 66 per cent by value, of the total catch in the FCZ.191 By
1979, foreign fishing in the United States' FCZ had been displaced
by only one per cent per year.1 92 That one per cent by volume
translates to less than three per cent by value. Thus, while the volume of the foreign catch has decreased slightly, the value of the
foreign catch has actually increased by thirty-seven million dollars
since 1976.19'

a. Fish Processing. The fish processing segment of the
United States fishing industry initially fared no better after the enactment of the FCMA. Foreign nations soon resorted to more indirect techniques to gain access to United States resources. One of
of circumventing the FCMA was
the more profitable methods
' 194
venture."
"joint
the
through
The joint venture arrangement involves a United States fisherman selling his catch to foreign processing ships operating within
the FCZ.' 95 The foreign vessels process the fish, take it abroad, and

Volume in thousands of metric tons and percent of total
U.S. Landings
1976
1977
1978
1979

.........................
.........................
.........................
.........................

720
689
841
803

(23%)
(29%)
(27%)
(33%)

Foreign catch
2,368
1,899
1,754
1,641

(77%)
(71%)
(73%)
(67%)

Total
3,088
2,338
2,395
2,444

Value (estimate) in millions of dollars and
percent of total
U.S. Landings

Foreign catch

Total

1976 .........................
1977 .........................

561 (56%)
689 (80%)

433 (44%)
445 (40%)

994
1,134

1978 .........................

641 (58%)

460 (42%)

1,101

1979 .........................

945 (66%)

470 (34%)

1,415

TABLE I
190. CONG. REC., supra note 3, at H9395.
191. See note 189 supra.
192. House Report, supra note 3, at 17.
193. Id.
194. See generally Christie, Regulation of InternationalJoint Ventures in the Fishery Conservation Zone, 10 GA.J.INT'L & COMP. L.85 (1980); Comment,Amendments to the Fishery
Conservation and ManagementAct of 1976: The Path to Expanded ProtectionforAmerican
Fish Processors, 10 LAW & POL. INT'L Bus. 1325 (1978).
195. Id. at 1329.
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then export it to the United States. 9 6 The United States, consequently, imports fish caught in its waters for a higher price than if
the whole operation had been done domestically. 19 7 The joint venture was soon perceived as a major loophole in the FCMA. 9 8
United States fish processors demanded an amendment to the
FCMA that would put their interests on parity with the interests of
the United States fisherman' 99 protected by the FCMA. 2 1 Congress' response was the Joint Venture Amendment 20 ' to the FCMA.
The Amendment "created United States processor preference
for American harvested fish similar to fisherman's priority in the
FCZ. 2 ° 2 It clearly prohibited foreign processing vessels from receiving those fish species which were being fully utilized by United
States processors. 20 3 The Amendment was ambiguous, however,
concerning United States processor preference regarding underutilized species. Ironically, this was the segment of the processing industry the FCMA specifically singled out in its purposes to
encourage.2° It still remains questionable whether the amendment
has given any priority to the United States onshore processor of
underutilized species. 201
The Amendment also fails to provide sufficiently clear guidelines for implementation of the processor preference given by the
FCMA. 2° Thus, in spite of the Amendment, United States processed fish products have increased only slightly over 11 per cent per
year since the enactment of the FCMA.2 °7 It has been suggested
that further guidance from Congress may be necessary before final
196. Id. But see Pereyra, Some Preliminary Results ofa U.S.-Soviet Joint Fishing Venture, 10 J. CoNrEMP. Bus. 7, 10 (1981). In the joint venture described therein the participating United States company markets the finished product in the international market. Less
than one percent of the fish are imported by the United States.
197. Id.
198. Christie, supra note 194, at 85.
199. Id. at 85-86.
200. See general, FCMA 16 U.S.C. § 1801 (1976). Before the Joint Venture Amendment the language in the FCMA was specifically oriented toward the United States fisherman.

201. Joint Venture Amendment, Pub. L. No. 95-354, 92 Stat. 519 (1978). The Act
amended various sections of the original FCMA.
202. Christie, supra note 194, at 86.
203. Among the species which are clearly not within the scope of the joint ventures are
salmon, king crab, halibut, surf clams, menhaden, lobster and shrimp. Christie, supra note
194, at 90.

204. Id. at 91.
205. Id.
206. Id.

207. House Report, supra note 3, at 17. Table II shows the increase in value by dollars of
United States processed fish products from 1976-1979.
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implementation
of the Joint Venture Amendment can be real208
ized.
b. Fish Imports and Exports. The United States import-export picture is also bleak. z 9 With approximately 20 per cent of the
world's fishery resources located off its shores, the United States
remains a net importer of seafood. z l Improved access for United
States fish products to foreign markets is crucial to the development

of the United States fishing industry. 11 Yet United States exports
are being closed out of many markets because of severe trade barriers. 21 2 Japan, for example, though harvesting far more fish from
the United States' FCZ than any other foreign nation, 21 3 continues
to impose some of the most restrictive quotas and oppressive import tariffs on United States exports of any country.21 4 Japan also
[In billions of dollars]
1976
1977
1978
1979

............................................................... 3.2
............................................................... 3.9
............................................................... 4.6
............................................................... 4.7
TABLE II

208. Christie, supra note 194, at 100.
209. House Report, supra note 3, at 17; CONG. REC., supra note 3, at H9395. Table III
compares the dollar amounts of United States fish imports and exports. Note that while the
growth in exports has been substantial the increase in imports has been greater.
[In millions of dollars]

1976
1977
1978
1979

..................................
..................................
..................................
..................................

Imports

Exports

Net

2,277
2,621
3,099
3,811

382.0
520.5
905.5
1,082.4

-1,895.0
-1,900.5
-2,193.5
-2,728.6

TABLE III
210. Id. at 17-18.
211. CONG. REC., supra note 3, at H9398.
212. House Report, supra note 3, at 30.
213. In 1979, Japan took 72 per cent by value and 68 per cent by volume, of all of the fish
harvested in the United States' FCZ. Japan's harvest was 1, 184,420.3 metric tons valued at
$297 million. According to the NMFS, this is an increase for Japan of $87 million over the
value of its 1976 catch in the same area. House Report, supra note 3, at 30-31.
214. Japan maintains a system of import quotas, exclusive or restrictive import licenses

and oppressive import tariffs that substantially impede imports of United States fish products. A recent GAO Report to the Committee entitled, "Developing Markets for Fish Not
Traditionally Harvested by the United States: The Problems and the Federal Role," states,
"Despite marketing opportunities in Japan, tariff and non-tariff trade barriers hamper
United States marketing efforts there. Japan maintains a tariff of between five and fifteen
percent on most imported fresh and frozen fish, including pollock. Non-tariff restrictions,
such as import quotas, present an even more important barrier to United States imports to
Japan ....
" House Report, supra note 3, at 31.
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happens to be one of the markets the United States is most heavily
dependent upon for its export trade.21 5 The result is that the
United States trade deficit continues to grow.21 6 As long as foreign
nations are permitted to continue a high level of fishing in the FCZ
and at the same time deny their markets to United States fish exporters by imposing restrictive quotas and oppressive import tariffs,
the United States will be unable to achieve full development of its
fishery resources. 2 7 Furthermore, the evidence shows that significant problems also are being encountered in the fulfillment of the
conservation and management objective of the FCMA.
2. The Conservation and Management of Fishery Resources.
The fishery conservation and management objective of the FCMA
recognized the need for a regulatory device to prevent the destruction of United States fisheries by overfishing.2 z 8 It was recognized
that the sea's living resources were not inexhaustible 2 19 and that
common pool resources, such as high seas fisheries, left unregulated
would eventually be destroyed. 220 A major portion of the FCMA is
devoted to setting out a scheme of regulations to prevent the ruin of
United States fisheries.
The FCMA sets out specific fishery conservation and management guidelines regulating the total allowable level of foreign fishing (TALFF) 22 1 in the United States' FCZ. In each fishery there is
to be determined a TALFF based on "that portion of the optimum
yield of such fishery which will not be harvested by vessels of the
United States . . 222 The TALFF is then allocated among foreign nations by the Secretary of State,2 23 who takes into account
224
such factors as the traditional fishing rights of the foreign nations
and whether they have cooperated with the United States in respect
to its conservation and management guidelines and enforcement
measures. 22 5 The continued threat to fish species off the coast of the
215. Id. at 30.
216. Id. at 17.
217. CONG. REC., supra note 3,at H9395.
218. 16 U.S.C. § 1801(a) (1976).
219. Id. § 1801(a)(5).
220. See notes 148-58 supra, and accompanying text.
221. See 16 U.S.C. § 1821 (1976).
222. Id. § 1821(d) as originally enacted. This section of the FCMA is now amended by
the Promotion Act, supra note 18, § 230.
223. Id. § 1821(e)(1).
224. Id. § 1821(e)(1)(A) as originally enacted. This same criterion is incorporated in the
FCMA as amended by the Promotion Act, supra note 18, § 231.
225. Id. § 1821(e)(1)(C) as originally enacted. This factor is also included in the
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United States appears to be the result, not so much of the inadequacies of the mechanics of the FCMA's conservation measures, but of
the difficulty in enforcing them.2 26
Since the enactment of the FCMA, it has become clear that
poor enforcement of its guidelines can lead to overfishing of a magnitude sufficient to undermine conservation and management
measures. 227 Unfortunately, the level of enforcement necessary to
achieve the effective conservation and management of fish stocks
has fallen far short of what is required.22 8 Currently, the resources
of the two bodies responsibile for enforcing the FCMA - the National Marine and Fisheries Service (NMFS) and the Coast Guard

- are stretched very thin.229 Overall observer coverage, wherein a
United States observer is placed on board the foreign vessel to
monitor the catch, is the surest and most effective means of enforcement. Yet the overall observer coverage is only 17.1 per cent off
Alaska, 22.1 per cent in the South Atlantic and 23.2 per cent in the
amended version. As a result of the American Fisheries Promotion Act amendment to
§ 1821(e)(1) of the FCMA, the factors now used in determining allocation of the TALFF are:
(A) whether, and to what extent, such nations impose tariff barriers or
nontariff barriers on the importation, or otherwise restrict the market access, of
United States fish or fishery products;
(B) whether, and to what extent, such nations are cooperating with the
United States in the advancement of existing and new opportunities for fisheries
trade, particulary through the purchase of fish or fishery products from United
States processors or from United States fishermen;
(C) whether, and to what extent, such nations and the fishing fleets of such
nations have cooperated with the United States in the enforcement of United States
fishing regulations;
(D) whether, and to what extent, such nations require the fish harvested from
the fishery conservation zone for their domestic consumption;
(E) whether, and to what extent, such nations otherwise contribute to, or foster the growth of, a sound and economic United States fishing industry, including
minimizing gear conflicts with fishing operations of United States fishermen, and
transferring harvesting or processing technology which will benefit the United
States fishing industry;
(F) whether, and to what extent, the fishing vessels of such nations have traditionally engaged in fishing in such fishery;
(G) whether, and to what extent, such nations are cooperating with the
United States in, and making substantial contributions to fishery research and the
identification of fishery resources; and
(H) such other matters as the Secretary of State, in cooperation with the Secretary, deems appropriate.
These criteria that the State Department must now use when it considers how to allocate
the TALFF have been termed the United States' "fish and chips" policy. Essentially, these
criteria put foreign nations on notice that the United States wants something in return for its
allocation of fish to foreign nations in the FCZ. See Sloan, The Fishing Industry and the
Future: Confronted with Limitless Opportunities, 10 J. CoNTEmp. Bus. 45, 46 (1981).
226. See generally CoNG. REC, supra note 3; House Report, supra note 3, at 33.

227. House Report, supra note 3, at 33.
228. CONG. REC., supra note 3, at H9394.
229. Id. at 33-34.
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Mid-Atlantic and New England areas. 23° At the same time, reports

from the NMFS indicate there may "be a formidable and possibly
pre-planned effort at non-compliance with the FCMA regulations..." by foreign fishing fleets.23 '
There was a total of 382 violations of the FCMA in 1979 by
foreign fishermen. 232 Most of these violations involve "the attempted concealment of total catches by erroneous entries into
ships' logs. '233 When combined, the violations constitute the reten-

tion and concealment of several thousand metric tons of fish.234 In
the view of the NMFS, these violations seriously frustrate their efforts to conserve
effectively and manage United States' fish re5
sources.

23

After four years and a cost of over $105 million for enforcement of the FCMA in 1979 alone, conservation and management of
the fishery resources in the FCZ are not at the level that was hoped
for when the FCMA was enacted. The current dissatisfaction with

the status quo of the fishing industry and the difficulty and cost of
enforcing the fishery conservation and management measures are
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Table IV shows the countries violating the FCMA and the number of incidents:
Violators in 1979 were the following:
Incidents
Japan .........................................................
147
Italy ..........................................................
87
Spain .........................................................
50
U .S.S.R . ......................................................
48
M exico .......................................................
35
Poland ....................
..............................
10
Korea ........................................................
4
C anada .......................................................
I
Total ...................................................
382
As of mid-May 1980, NMFS reported 5 serious underloggings in percentages
ranging from 17 to 35. There were 17 major violations in 1979 and 1980, a major
increase over 1977 and 1978. Those violators were as follows:
Incidents
Japan .........................................................
9
K orea ........................................................
3
T aiwan .......................................................
3
U .S.S.R . ......................................................
I
Poland ........................................................
I
T otal ...................................................
17
TABLE IV

House Report, supra note 3,at 34.
233. Id. at 33-34.
234. Id,
235. Id.
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providing the atmosphere for extreme solutions. Pressure is building for a complete phase-out of foreign fishing.2 36
III.

THE PROSPECT OF PHASING-OUT FOREIGN FISHING

The primary objective of the FCMA is the conservation and
management of United States fishery resources. 237 The FCMA recognized that although these resources are subject to total depletion
and irreversible damage if overfished, they are renewable. 238 The
Act outlines a program of national conservation and management
to replenish overfished stocks and maintain them at a level sufficient to provide optimum yields on a continuing basis.2 39 United
States fishing fleets were to have preferential access to the fisheries
while foreign fleets were to be allowed access only if a portion of
the optimum yield was not harvested by United States' fleets. 24 It
was projected that this preferential access would promote the sagging United States fishing industry. 24' As discussed, neither of
these goals has been fully realized by the FCMA.24 2 Many perceive
the problem to be the continued fishing in the United States' FCZ
by foreign fishermen.24 3 A proposed solution therefore is to eliminate completely the foreign fleets from the FCZ by phasing-out
their fishing activities. Such a measure must be evaluated in the
light of the FCMA's own phase-out mechanism and existing and
projected international law.
A.

The Needfor a Phase-Out

One of the earliest concepts to emerge from fisheries management science was maximum sustainable yield (MSY). 24 The theory of MSY is that for each stock of fish there exists a level of
fishing at which the maximum tonnage of fish can be taken year
after year without depleting the stock. 4 5 If the maximum sustainable yield of a fishery is exceeded, the stock will be depleted and it
will eventually become economically infeasible for the fishery to
236. See Jones, Freedom of Fishing in Decline.- The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 and the ImplicationsforJapan, 11 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 52 (1981).

237. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801(b) & 1851(a)(2) (1976).
238. Id. § 1801(a)(5).
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

Id. §§ 1801(a)(5) & 1801(a)(6).
Id. § 1821(a) & (d).
See House Report, supra note 3. See also id. § 1801(b)(3).
See notes 187-235 supra, and accompanying text.
See generaly House Report, supra note 3.
MANAGING THE SEAS RESOURCES, supra note 145, at 3-6.
Id.
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continue.24 6 The shortcomings of MSY are that it relies solely on
biological criteria and fails to take into account the social, political
and economic factors also associated with fishery management.247
In the middle 1950's, a new theory suggested that the only realistic objective of a conservation program was to achieve in each
fishery "a state of optimum fishing" 248 based on a combination of
economic, biologic and social factors. Only if all these criteria were
taken into equal consideration could an optimum sustainable yield
in a fishery be achieved. The undercurrent of this theory is that
there is a point below the MSY at which it is no longer economically profitable to increase the catch. 249 This point is the optimum
yield (OY) of a fishery and in practice will always be less than the
maximum sustainable yield of a stock.25 °
The FCMA recognizes that optimum yield is a major goal of
fishery management 25 ' and makes the attainment of an OY in each
fishery its primary objective.252 Optimum yield, as used in the
FCMA, is defined253 in terms of what provides "the greatest overall
benefit to the nation" 25 4 coupled with a prescribed level of fishing
based on a modification of the maximum sustainable yield by "relevant economic, social or ecological factor[s]. ' ' 25 5 From a determi-

nation of the optimum yield of the fishery and the United States
catch, the level of foreign fishing in the FCZ is set.
The FCMA provides United States fishing fleets with preferential access to harvest the optimum yield from each fishery. 2 6 In
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. As early as the 1900's empirical evidence was available which showed that overfishing was the prime cause of the depletion of oceanic fisheries. In the 1930's F.S. Russel introduced a theory which linked stock abundance to additions via growth and recruitment and to
losses via natural and fishing mortality. Combining this empirical and theoretical reasoning
led to the generalization that for a given stock of fish there exists an MSY and an associated
level of fishing which will achieve that yield. MSY became a principal goal of fisheries
management following the turn of the century. MANAGING THE SEAS RESOURCES, supra
note 145, at 8; G. KNIGHT, supra note 130, at 662(a)-662(h).

249. Id.
250. This generalization concerns total catch which is a biological phenomenon related
to stock rather than catch. G. KNIGHT, supra note 130, at 552(h).
251. 16 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(4) (1976).
252. Id.
253. Id. § 1802(18).
254. Id. § 1802(18)(A).
255. Id. § 1802(18)(B).

256. It is important to note that a glaring deficiency of this definition is the lack of criteria for establishing what constitutes "the greatest overall benefit to the Nation." See Alverson, The Role of Conservation and Fishery Science Under the Fishery Cons.& Management Ac
of 1976, 52 WASH. L. REv. 723, 727-29 (1977). See also Christy, The Fishery Conservation
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any given season, the foreign fisherman is allowed to take only that
portion of the optimum yield the United States' fleets do not harvest. 257 This amount is the total allowable level of foreign fishing
(TALFF) allowed by the FCMA.2 58 If, in any given year, the
United States fisherman has the capacity to harvest the full optimum yield, then the foreign fisherman will be completely excluded
from that fishery for that year. Thus, a mechanism for the phaseout of foreign fishing is in fact built into the FCMA by giving absolute preference in all fisheries to the United States fisherman and
allowing the foreign fisherman to harvest only that portion of the
optimum yield the United States fisherman does not. 259 The advantage of this formula is that, in the event the United States fisherman does not take the optimum yield from a fishery, the surplus
will not be left unused. 2 ° The Secretary of State is authorized to
allocate this surplus - the TALFF - among foreign nations wishing access to fisheries under the exclusive management authority of
the United States.26 '
In contrast, the legislative proposal 262 for a mandatory phaseout is intended automatically to phase-out foreign fishing in the
and Management Act of 1976: Management Objectives and the Distributionof Benefits and
Costs, 52 WASH. L. REV. 657, 658 (1977).
257. It should be noted that an implied requirement of this section is that any deviation
from the MSY for economic, social or biological reasons within any management plan must
be substantiated by use of the best scientific information available. 16 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(3) &
§ 185 l(a)(2) (1976); Alverson, The Role of ConservationandFisheryScience Under the Fishery
Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 52 WASH. L. REV. 723 (1977). See also Comment, 52 WASH. L. REV. 599 (1977). This definition also suffers from a major weakness since
the only real clue to a scientific objective for optimum yield is the stipulation in Subchapter
III of the FCMA that conservation and management measures shall, "where practicable,
promote efficiency in the utilization of fishery resources; except that no such measure shall
have economic allocation as its sole purpose." 16 U.S.C. § 1851(a)(5) (1976).
258. For example, if the optimum yield of a fishery is determined to be 100,000 tons and
the United States capacity is 60,000 tons then the foreign fisherman would be allowed to take
40,000 tons from that fishery.
259. 16 U.S.C. § 1821(d) (1976) and Promotion Act, supra note 18, § 230. This statement
is the net result of 16 U.S.C. § 1821(d) both before and after the American Fisheries Promotion Act amendment. The Promotion Act does little more than complicate the original provision of the FCMA which it amends. The key provision in the amended version of
§ 1821(d) which essentially leads to the same net result as the original provision, is the carryover provision of § 182 1(d)(4).
260. See House Report, supra note 3, for dissenting views. In Title III of the House
Report, McClosky states that it would be a waste of valuable protein to leave these stocks
unused.
261. 16 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(1). See note 225 supra.
262. See House Report, supra note 3, at 8. This was the House passed version of a proposed amendment to the FCMA before the enactment of the American Fisheries Promotion
Act. Henceforth, the Bill will be referred to as the "legislative proposal."
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FCZ regardless of what portion of the optimum yield the United
States' fleets harvest in any given year. It will automatically reduce
the allowable foreign catch by a certain specified percentage each
year until no foreign fishing would be allowed in the FCZ. The
mechanism specifically proposed in Title III of the legislative pro2 64
posal2 63 would establish a "phase-out reduction factor amount"
that would, in the first year of implementation, reduce "the aggregate harvest by all foreign nations in that fishery. .. 265 (the base
harvest) by 15 per cent. Each consecutive year the base harvest
amount would be reduced by an amount equal to 10 to 15 per cent,
provided the United States' fleets could harvest 50 to 75 per cent of
the amount denied foreign fleets in the previous year. 266 This process would continue until no foreign fishing would be allowed. 6 7
Best estimates predict that such a program, if begun in 1981, for
example, would eliminate foreign fishing in the FCZ by 1990.261
Since the FCMA contains its own phase-out mechanism conditioned on the United States fish catch in any given year, a need
for a categorical exclusion of foreign fishing fleets appears to be
lessened. Of more importance, however, are the possible violations
of international law a phase-out program might cause if enacted.
B.

Possible Violations of InternationalLaw by
Excluding Foreign Fishing

Compared to the absence of regulations before 1976 on foreign
fishing fleets outside United States' territorial waters, the FCMA
placed strict limitations on foreign fishing within 200 miles of the
United States' territorial sea.2 69 When the FCMA was enacted, it
not only lacked support in international law, 27° but also violated
263. Id.

264. Id. at 8, § 301(1)(C).
265. Id.
266. Id. For example, assuming that the TALFF in 1981 was 40,000 tons, an automatic
15 per cent reduction (6,000 tons) would allow the foreign fleets to harvest only 34,000 tons in

the first year, even if the United States fleets did not harvest that 6,000 tons. In each subsequent year another 10 to 15 per cent reduction in the 1981 TALFF amount of 40,000 tons
would be denied the foreign fleets if the United States fleets harvested 50 to 75 per cent of the
40,000 ton amount denied.
267. Id. at 8, § 301(4).
268. This was the prediction of fishery management authorities if implemented. Id. For
the mechanism now used in determining the TALFF, see Promotion Act, supra note 18,
§ 230, which amends § 1821(d) of the FCMA.
269. Seegenerally the FCMA, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882 (1976). This was the result of the
Fishery Management regulations.
270. See generally Moore, Foreign Policy and Fidelity to Law, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 802

(1976).
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United States' treaty obligations and contradicted United States
ocean policy. 27 1 Using the proposed legislation 272 as a paradigm, a
phase-out of foreign fishing would come about by amendment to
Title II of the FCMA. 273 Thus, the violations of international law,
by enacting a program to exclude foreign fishing fleets from United
States' waters, would in many ways parallel the FCMA's earlier
treaty violations.2 74
1. Possible Treaty Violations. The two major treaties still in
force involving high seas fishing rights are the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas 275 and the Convention on Fishing and
Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas.2 76 By categorically excluding foreign fishing within 200 miles of the United
States' territorial sea, the United States would be in violation of
Articles 2, 6, and 22 of the High Seas Convention and Articles 1, 7,
and 9 through 12 of the Fishing Convention.
a. The Geneva Convention on the High Seas. Article 2277 of
the High Seas Convention grants to all nations, inter alia, the "freedom of fishing" 278 and further provides that "no state may validly
purport to subject any part. . .[of the high seas]. . . to its sovereignty. '2 79 By closing off a 200-mile fishery zone and excluding
foreign fishing, the traditional freedom of fishing guaranteed by Article 2 is violated and the high sea is thereby subjected to national
sovereignty. 280 Article 6 of the High Seas Convention would also
be breached since it provides that a ship "shall be subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction on the high seas"'
of the nation under
whose flag it sails. Under a phase-out program, a foreign fishing
vessel upon entering the United States' 200-mile FCZ would, for
purposes of fishing, be under the jurisdiction of United States'
271. Id.
272. See notes 16-17 & 261-67 supra.
273. See House Report, supra note 3; see also Promotion Act, supra note 18, as an example of how the FCMA might be amended.
274. But note, as discussed infra, at note 328, and accompanying text, it also would go
beyond the FCMA because it was not conditional.
275. See note 85 supra, and accompanying text.
276. See note 86 supra.
277. See High Seas Convention, supra note 85, art. 2.
278. Id. art. 2, para. 1.
279. Id.
280. See note 362 aifra.
281. High Seas Convention, supra note 85, art. 2.
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laws.2 82 The vessel would be required to limit its catch to a specified per cent 283 and eventually to refrain from fishing. 284 The only
exception allowed by Article 6 to this "exclusive jurisdiction of one
state" requirement is an exception which is "expressly provided for
in international treaties.

..."I8

The phase-out program would

clearly not qualify for this exception since it would be a unilateral
action, not a treaty.
Under Article 22286 of the High Seas Convention, a warship
may not board another ship on the high seas unless there is reasonable ground for suspecting the ship is engaged in piracy, slave
trade, or is of the same nationality as the warship. Under a phaseout program enacted pursuant to the FCMA,2 87 the Coast Guard
would be authorized to board and if necessary to seize any vessel
which it had cause to believe was in violation of the Act.28 8 Boarding and seizing a vessel for fishing violations clearly does not fall
within Article 22 and would be in violation of that provision.289
b. The Geneva Convention on Fishingand Conservation of the
Living Resources of the High Seas. The enactment of a phase-out

program would also violate Articles 1, 7, and 9 through 12 of the
Fishing Convention. 29° Article 1, paragraph 1 of the Convention
enumerates the right of different nationals "to engage in fishing on
the high seas; ' ' 291 paragraph 2 provides that all countries are dutybound "to adopt or to cooperate with other states in adopting such
measures for their respective nationals as may be necessary for the
conservation of the living resources of the high seas. ' 292 Thus, by
the terms of this treaty, the United States cannot restrict fishing by
other countries, absent bilateral or multilateral agreements, without
cooperating with those countries.2 93 Similarly, being a unilateral
measure, a phase-out program would seem to be in conflict with the
basic premise of the Fishing Convention that "the problems in282. See House Bill, supra note 3.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. High Seas Convention, supra note 85, art. 6.
286. Id. art. 22.
287. See note I supra.
288. 16 U.S.C. 1861(b) (1976).
289. See High Seas Convention, supra note 85, art. 22.
290. See note 284 supra, and accompanying text.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Kindt, Special Claims Impacting Upon Marine Pollution Issues at the Third U.N.
Conference on the Law ofthe Sea, 10 CALIF. W. INT'L L.J. 397, 418 (1980).

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons,

35

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 12, No. 1 [], Art. 6
FISHERY CONSERVATION

volved in the conservation of the living resources of the high seas is
such that there is a clear necessity that they be solved, whenever
possible, on the basis of international co-operation
through the con294
certed action of all the states concerned.
Article 7 of the Fishing Convention contemplates "unilateral
measures of conservation appropriate to any stock of fish. .. 295

provided certain specified criteria are met. These measures include
nondiscrimination against foreign fishermen, a prior six-month effort to find a negotiated solution, and submission of disputed ac-

tions to impartial arbitration." Since the prevailing legal opinion is
that Article 7 reflects customary international law,2 96 a blanket exclusion of foreign fishing within the United States' 200-mile FCZ
would not only be a violation of this fishing treaty, but contrary to
customary international law as well.
c. Other Treaties. Other limited multilateral and bilateral
fishing agreements, though most are of a relatively short duration,2 97 would also be violated by a phase-out measure. Since access to the FCZ by foreign fleets would automatically be
terminated at the conclusion of a phase-out program, 298 any treaty
granting fishing rights to foreign nationals in the FCZ would be in
jeopardy. As discussed, 299 the phase-out measure would be by
amendment to the FCMA and therefore the Act's unamended provisions would still govern. 3° Title II of the FCMA requires the
Secretary of State to renegotiate promptly "any treaty which pertains to fishing within the fishery conservation zone. . . which is in
any manner inconsistent with the purposes, policy, or provisions of
this [Act] . . .30 Such treaties must be renegotiated in a reasonable time or, by terms of the Act, the United States must withdraw
from the treaty.3 °2 As discussed, exclusion of foreign vessels from
the FCZ would be inconsistent with existing fishing treaties.
The United States Constitution places a treaty and a legislative
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
are still
301.
302.

Fishing Convention, supra note 86, Preamble.
Id. art. 7.
See Moore, supra note 270, at 804.
Id. at 805.
See House Bill, supra note 3, Title III, § 301(d)(4).
See text accompanying note 281 supra.
Using House Bill, supra note 3, as a paradigm, the other provisions of the FCMA
kept in force.
16 U.S.C. § 1822(b) (1976).
Id.
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act on equal footing.303 When legislation is in conflict with a treaty,
the most recent in date will control.3" Thus, subsequent legislation
enacting a phase-out program would be given effect over a prior
conflicting treaty such as the Fishery Convention. Relying on this
constitutional basis as justification for enforcing a phase-out measure against foreign parties would, however, be a violation of customary international law. The applicable rule, as codified in
Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,3 °5 provides that "[a] party may not invoke the provisions of its internal
law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. '' 3°6 Thus, by
refusing to perform according to the terms of the treaty, the United
States would be the party in default.
2. Pacta Sunt Servanda. The international legal rule ofpacta

sunt servanda30 7 may also be jeopardized by enacting legislation to
phase-out foreign fishing. Article 26 of the Vienna Convention, in
regard to this fundamental rule of customary international law,30 8
states that "[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it
and must be performed by them in good faith. ' ' 3° The essence of
pacta sunt servanda is that treaties create binding law between signatories and must be observed. "The rule also connotes that a
party must abstain from acts calculated to defeat the objects and
purposes of the treaty. ' ' 310 That is, parties are duty bound to act in
good faith. Arguably, under the doctrine ofpacta sunt servanda, by
enacting legislation inconsistent with prior treaties, the United
States is acting in bad faith in the performance of its treaty obligations and thus is in violation of the doctrine. If this were the case,
303. The United States Supreme Court has "repeatedly taken the position that an Act of
Congress.. .is on a full parity with a treaty, and that when a statute which is subsequent in
time is inconsistent with a treaty, the statute to the extent of conflict renders the treaty null."
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957).
304. Id.
305. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, openedfor signature, May 23, 1969.
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 (1969), art. 27, entered intoforce on Jan. 27, 1980, reprintedin 63
AM. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Vienna Convention]. This Convention is
codified international law and has been cited as authority for customary law in court decisions and state practice. See Barcelona Traction Case, [1970] I.C.J. 3, 303, 305; Nambia
Case, [1971] I.C.J. 16, 47; Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, [1973] I.C.J. 3, 14, 18, 21, 43, 47; Nuclear Tests Case, [1974] I.C.J. 253, 334-38, 349, 357, 418.
306. Id. art. 27.
307. The rulepactasunt servanda literally translated means "contracts (treaties) are to be
kept." G. SCHWARTZENBERGER & E. BROWN, supra note 45, at 564.

308. T.

ELIAS, THE MODERN LAW OF TREATIES

40 (1974).

309. Vienna Convention, supra note 305, art. 26.
310. T. ELIAS, supra note 308, at 42.
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the enactment of a measure to phase-out foreign fishing would
amount to a unilateral termination of all treaties involving foreign
fishing in the FCZ.
Unilateral termination is a decision to terminate an agreement
which has become objectionable to one party.3 1 In the absence of
protest by the other party, the conflict may be regarded as settled.3 12 Even in the face of protests, however, the customary international law rule of rebus sic stantibus 3 13 may be invoked.
3. Rebus Sic Stantibus. The FisheriesJurisdiction Case. Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, in regard
to the rule of rebus sic stantibus, states that "[a] fundamental change
in circumstances which has occurred with regard to those existing
at the time of the conclusion of a treaty. . . may not be invoked as
a ground for terminating or withdrawing from the treaty unless:
(a) the existence of those circumstances constituted an essential basis of the consent of the parties to be bound by the treaty; and,
(b) the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of
obligations still to be performed under the treaty." The essence of
rebus sic stantibus is that when fundamental changes occur in the
circumstances which formed the basis of a treaty, a party may, in
certain cases, be permitted to withdraw or terminate the treaty on
that ground. The justification for the application of this doctrine in
the modem law of treaties is to encourage States to seek legal solutions to their treaty problems. Such a solution is deemed more feasible than the use of self-help when the State wishing to terminate
its treaty obligations is confronted with a recalcitrant party not willing to recognize the difficulty of continued performance due to
changed circumstances. 31 4
In the FisheriesJurisdictionCase of 1974, between the United
Kingdom and Iceland and the Federal Republic of Germany and
Iceland,3" 5 the International Court of Justice (I.C.J.) explicitly rec311.

A. DAVID, THE STRATEGY OF TREATY TERMINATION 60 (1975).

312. Id. at 61.

313. Rebussicstanlibusis the doctrine that a treaty is intended by the parties to be binding only as long as there is no vital change in the circumstances which, at the time of the
conclusion of the treaty, all the parties had assumed. G. SCHWARZENBEROER & E. BROWN,
supra note 45, at 551.
314. T. ELIAS, supra note 308, at 121.
315. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (United Kingdom v. Iceland) Jurisdiction of the Court,
Judgment of February 2, 1973, ICJ Reports, 1973, at 3. The comparable Judgment of Fisheries Jurisdiction (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), Judgment of February 2, 1973,
ICJ Reports, 1973, at 49, is in many, but not all, respects identically worded. For the purposes of this study reference is made only to the United Kingdom case.
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ognized the principle laid down in Article 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.3 16 The Fisheries Jurisdiction Case
concerned a dispute between the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of Iceland.3 17 The dispute arose out of a
unilateral claim by Iceland to extend its exclusive fisheries jurisdiction to a zone of 50 nautical miles around its shore and to phase-out
the historic fishing rights of foreign nations within that zone.3 18
The facts and resolution of this case by the I.C.J. may have value
for projecting the international consequences of a United States
phase-out program.
Following the failure of the 1958 Geneva Conference, Iceland
undertook to extend its exclusive fishing zone to twelve miles. The

United Kingdom, in an Exchange of Notes, 319 reluctantly recognized Iceland's 12-mile exclusive fishing zone in exchange for a
three year phasing-out period within that zone and a compromissory clause in the agreement that would, at the request of either
party, refer a dispute to the I.C.J.32° Ten years after this Exchange
of Notes, in the face of over exploitation of its fish stocks and the
need to increase its catch, Iceland extended its exclusive fishing
zone to 50 miles. 321' The United Kingdom objected and, after several months of fruitless negotiations, the dispute was brought
before the I.C.J. Though Iceland contended the Court had no jurisdiction and never appeared before it, the I.C.J., noting its obligations and authority to establish its own jurisdiction,322 proceeded to
give its judgment on the merits.
The two fundamental issues presented to the Court of interest
316. The Court, did not, however, employ the term rebus sic stantibus, which had also
been abandoned by the International Law Commission so as to avoid its doctrinal implications. Cf. 2 Y.B. INT. L. COMM. 258 (1966). (Report of the International Law Commission,
18th Sess., Commentary (par. 7) on art. 59); 61 Am. J. INT'L L. 432 (1967). See also Briggs,
68 AM. J. INT'L L. 51, 61 (1974).
317. See note 315 supra; reference will be made to only one case in text since both are
similar.
318. T. ELIAS, supra note 308, at 123. See also Bowett, Note, 33 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 179;
Fleischer, supra note 171, at 576.
319. Iceland-Federal Republic of Germany. Exchange of Notes constituting an Agreement concerning the Fishery Zone around Iceland, Reykjavik, July 19, 1961, 409 U.N.T.S.
47. Iceland-United Kingdom. Exchange of Notes constituting an Agreement settling the

Fisheries Dispute, Reykjavik, March 11, 1961, 397 U.N.T.S. 275.
320. T. ELIAS, supra note 308, at 123.
321. Iceland implemented this action by the Resolution of the Althing of February 15,
1972 and Regulations of July 14, 1972. Text of Notes reprinted in I LAY, CHURCHILL AND
NORDQUIST, NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 89.

322. See Statute of the I.CJ., supra note 71, art. 36 & 37.
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here323 were: (1) Iceland's right to terminate unilaterally a treaty
under the rebus sic stantibus principle as embodied in Article 62 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties; and, (2) the possible obligation on the part of Iceland to allow other States to fish in
its exclusive fishery zone. Iceland relied on Article 62 of the Vienna Convention, maintaining that rebus sic stantibus was sufficient
justification for terminating its treaty with the United Kingdom,3 24
in which the two parties had agreed to a twelve mile limit.
The Court found that a nation's right with regard to denunciation of treaties, as set forth in the Vienna Convention and in customary international law, is surrounded by substantive conditions
and limitations. The Court emphasized that for a change of circumstances to give rise to grounds for invoking the termination of a
treaty, the circumstances must have "resulted in a radical transformation of the extent of the obligations still to be performed."3'2 5
The Court also limited the scope of rebus sic stantibus by stressing,
as dicta, "that the doctrine never operates so as to extinguish a
treaty automatically or to allow an unchangeable denunciation by
one party; it only operates to confer a right to call for termination
and, if that call is disputed, to submit the dispute to some organ or
the conditions for the operbody with power to determine whether
326
present.
are
doctrine
ation of the
Iceland's major contention was that there had been fundamental changes in fishing techniques leading to depletion of its offshore
resources. Iceland primarily contended that there had been fundamental changes in legal opinion on fisheries jurisdiction in the ten
year interim since the Iceland-United Kingdom treaty. Iceland
reasoned that since 12-mile fishing zones had become generally accepted, the previously bargained for treaty, allowing Iceland a 12mile zone, now failed for lack of consideration. Thus, Iceland was
relieved of its commitments because of the changed legal circum323. Other issues presented to the Court were whether the I.C.J. had jurisdiction over the
case because Iceland refused to appear; and whether a claim to an exclusive fishing zone of
50 miles was contrary to international law (the 12-mile limit being the broadest at this time).
324. Iceland did not recognize the Court's jurisdiction and refused to submit oral or written pleadings. They did, however, effectively communicate with the I.C.J. as Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice observed in his separate opinion:
Iceland has sent to the Court a series of letters and telegrams on the subject, often

containing material going far beyond the question of competence and entering
deeply into the merits, and has lost no opportunity of doing the same thing through
statements made or circulated in the United Nations, and by other means, all of
which have of course been brought to the attention of the Court in one way or
another as, doubtless, they were intended to be.
325. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, supra note 315, at 21, para. 43.
326. Reprinted in T. ELIAS, supra note 308, at 122-23.
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stances.3 27
The Court, in applying the provisions of Article 62 to Iceland's
contentions, recognized that "changes in the law may under certain
conditions constitute valid grounds for invoking a change of circumstances affecting the duration of a treaty." The Court failed,
however, to decide the issue on these grounds. It held the changed
circumstances irrelevant and overshadowed by Iceland's failure to
comply with the compromissory clause in the treaty which conferred jurisdiction on the I.C.J. to decide disputes, such as this one,
between the parties. On Iceland's claim of a fundamental change
in fishing techniques, the Court recognized the "exceptional dependence of Iceland on its fisheries for its subsistence and economic
development," but nevertheless found no fundamental change of
circumstances which radically increased the burden of obligations
still to be performed by Iceland. Thus, the only I.C.J. view to be
abstracted from this case, regarding an Article 62 claim to terminate unilaterally a fishing treaty because of changed circumstances,
appears to be that over-exploitation of a fishery and economic
hardship are not sufficient to constitute a fundamental change of
circumstances.
Applying the rule of this case to a United States claim to unilateral termination on the basis of Article 62's fundamental change
of circumstances may not appear to produce very positive results.
The claims of economic hardship and overexploitation of fishery
resources are precisely what prompted consideration by the United
States of a phase-out program. Thus, a claimed unilateral right of
termination on these bases might not receive a favorable response.
The case was essentially decided on the second issue, of
foreign fishing rights in a state's fishery zone, and therefore has special relevance to the enactment of a United States phase-out program. Such a measure would be a categorical rather than a
conditional exclusion of foreign fishing (as the FCMA is now). The
crucial international legal question that would have to be answered
in such a case of complete categorical exclusion, and one explicitly
addressed in the FisheriesJurisdiction Case, is whether the coastal
State has an obligation to allow other States to fish in its extended
exclusive fishery zone. The majority of the Court was clear in stating that "the concept of preferential rights of fishing in adjacent
waters in favor of the coastal State"3 2 ' had crystallized as custom327. Id. at 124.
328. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, supra note 315, at 23.
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ary international law.329 The Court held that Iceland was entitled
to "preferential rights" in the area between 12 and 50 nautical miles
but it was further concluded that "the concept of preferential right
is not compatible with the exclusion of all fishing activities of other
states. '330 Furthermore, the Court held that a phase-out of the

United Kingdom's historic fishing rights in a 50-mile zone was not
a significant recognition of its rights. 33' "The coastal State has to
take into account and pay regard to the position of such other
States, particularly when they have established an economic dependence on the same fishing grounds.

' 33 2

Hence, the I.C.J. opinion is,

unequivocally, that a phase-out of foreign fishing in the high seas
or any zone endowed with high seas freedoms is contrary to international law.
The relevance of the I.C.J. judgments today, however, has
been called into question. First, Iceland never appeared before the
Court and consequently, the judgment was delivered by default in
accordance with Article 53 of the Statute of the I.C.J.333 At least
one writer holds the opinion that "the legal reasoning of the judgments cannot claim to have exactly the same status as if the judg3 34
ments had been rendered on the basis of adversary proceedings.
Perhaps more important is the fairly rapid evolution of State practice and international law which has occurred since the I.C.J. judgments. Since then the United States, Canada, Mexico and Japan
have declared 200-mile EEZ's. These claims would no doubt provide a wholly new atmosphere for the situation and of course the
Court would be free to deviate completely from its FisheriesJurisdiction judgment since it is not bound by stare decisis as are United
States courts.33 5 Since we are at a stage of fairly rapid evolution in
international law, it is necessary to examine the impact of a
mandatory phase-out program on developing international law.
4. Possible Violations of Developing Customary International
329. Id.
330. Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, supra note 315, at 27-28 (emphasis added).
331. The I.C.J. found inter alia:
[t]hat the principle of reasonable regard for the interests of other states enshrined in
Article 2 of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas of 1958 require Iceland and
the United Kingdom to have due regard to each other's interests, and to the interests of other states, in those resources.
Id. at 29.
332. See note 330 supra.
333. See note 322 supra.
334. Fleischer, supra note 171, at 573.
335. L. HENKIN, supra note 27, at 87-88 (1980).
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Law. Conflicts with the Law of the Sea Treaty. The Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea (Informal Text)33 6 is the principal document around which the current Law of the Sea (LOS) negotiations
are proceeding. Although the provisions of the Draft Convention
do not have the status of international law, they do reflect widely
accepted State practice and may be said to represent emerging or
developing customary international law.3 37 If international rules
on fisheries jurisdiction do emerge from the LOS Conference negotiations in the near future, it is thus possible, on the basis of the
Draft Convention, to predict accurately what those rules will be.3 38
It is therefore important to note the ways in which a United States'
phase-out program, if enacted, would be inconsistent with the text
of the Draft Convention.
The United States enactment of a program to phase-out
foreign fishing would be violative of Articles 62 and 69 of the Exclusive Economic Zone section of the Draft Convention on the Law
of the Sea. Article 62, paragraph 2, on Utilization of the Living
Resources, provides that "[wihere the coastal State does not have
the capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch, it shall, . . . give
other States access to the surplus. ' 3 39 A clue as to which States are
the ones to have access is given in paragraph 3 of Article 62, which
mentions "the need to minimize economic dislocation in States
whose nationals have habitually fished in the zone." 3" As mentioned, 341 the phase-out program, once concluded, would not give
access to any State whether the United States harvests the allowable catch or not. Article 69, which addresses the rights of landlocked States, 34 2 provides, in paragraph 3, that even when a coastal
State is able to harvest the entire allowable catch of fish in its FCZ,
"the coastal State and other States concerned shall cooperate in the
establishment of equitable arrangments on a bilateral, subregional
or regional basis." The proposed phase-out program would be a
unilateral action with the FCMA 343 and would doubtfully, by its
very nature, make any arrangements on a bilateral, subregional or
336. Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea (Informal Text) A/CONF.62/WP.10/
Rev.3/Add.1, (1980) [hereinafter cited as Draft Convention].
337. Jacobson & Cameron, Potential Conflicts between a FutureLaw ofthe Sea Treaty and
the Fishery Conservationand Management Act, 52 WASH. L. REV. 427, 451-55 (1977).
338. Id.
339. See Draft Convention, supra note 336, art. 62.
340. Id.

341. See text accompanying notes 261 & 262 supra.
342. See Draft Convention, supra note 336, art. 9.
343. See House Bill and House Report, supra note 3.
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regional basis. The provisions of the phase-out proposal are, on
their face, contradictory to these Articles of the LOS Draft Convention. Furthermore, a phase-out would be in violation of Articles
87, 92 and 110 of the High Seas section of the Draft Convention.
These Articles are identical to Articles 2, 6 and 22, respectively, of
the High Seas Convention which, as discussed previously, are inconsistent with the enactment of a phase-out program.
The possible violations of treaties, customary international law
and developing customary international law may not be sufficient
to deter the enactment of a mandatory phase-out program if the
United States deems it necessary to protect its interests in the sea.
When economic necessity and the need to employ stricter measures
for preserving United States' fishery resources reach the point
where it is deemed necessary to enact a mandatory phase-out program, the United States will undoubtedly set forth a justification
for enforcement of the action.
C

JustfcationforEnforcement

1. The Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea. The arguments for justifying the implementation of a phase-out program
may be rather tenuous in comparison to the blatant violations of
international law which the legislation might cause if enacted. A
possible argument to support the adoption of a phase-out measure
is that, based on Articles 61 and 62 of the Draft Convention on the
Law of the Sea, a mandatory phase-out program would be consistent with developing customary international law.345
Articles 61 and 62 of the Draft Convention deal specifically
with conservation and utilization of the living resources within the
EEZ34 and are the initial obstacle to compliance with the Exclusive Economic Zone section of the Draft Convention. 347 By highlighting the coastal States' right to determine the allowable catch in
its EEZ348 and its responsibility for maintenance of the fish stocks,
as qual#ied by environmental and economic factors,349 it could be
maintained that the foreign State's right of access to the United
344. See text accompanying notes 276-88 supra.
345. See House Report, supra note 3, at 23-30.
346. For purposes of fisheries, the 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is the functional equivalent of the 200-mile United States fishery conservation zone (FCZ) as established by the FCMA. Id. at 24.
347. See Draft Convention, supra note 336, pt. v.
348. Id. art. 61, para. 1.
349. Id. para. 2 & 3.
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States' FCZ is only a conditional privilege. 350
The text of Article 61 allows the coastal State to maintain fish
stocks at a MSY capacity 35 ' as qualied by relevant environmental

and economic factors.352 If there is a surplus of fish in a given year,
Article 62, paragraph 2, provides that the coastal State must negotiate agreements or other arrangements with foreign nations to allow
them access to the EEZ to harvest that surplus. These agreements,
however, may also be qualfied by a number of factors enumerated
in Article 62, paragraph 4, such as licensing, observer programs and
setting of quotas.35 3 Article 62, paragraph 3, allows the coastal
State to take into account "the significance of the living resources of
the area to the economy of the coastal State concerned and its other
national interests" in determining the allowable foreign catch and
giving access to other States to its EEZ. The language of the Articles have a somewhat discretionary tone, allowing the coastal State
to place many qualifications on the foreign nations fishing activities
in the coastal State's EEZ. It has been argued that there is no absolute right of foreign States to the surplus of fish in the 200-mile
zones.354 Such an alleged right is in fact a conditional privilege.355
Thus, a phase-out program which sets a phase-out rate based on a
percentage of the previous year's domestic catch,356 as the proposed
phase-out legislation does, would be consistent with the rights of
the coastal State to have complete discretion in determining the allowable level of foreign catch.
2.

Governing International Fishing Agreements. The United

States also enjoys a certain amount of flexibility with the Governing International Fishery Agreements (GIFA)3 57 provided for
by the FCMA. Title II of the FCMA requires that all foreign fishing in the United States' FCZ be conducted pursuant to a GIFA.
At present, all agreements between foreign nations and the United
States granting Reciprocal Fishing Rights are pursuant to
350. House Report, supra note 3, at 26.
351. See notes 244-47 supra, and accompanying text.
352. Draft Convention, supra note 336, art. 62, para. 1.
353. Id. See para. 4(a)-(k).
354. House Report, spra note 3, at 26.
355. Id.
356. See text accompanying notes 264-65 supra.
357. 16 U.S.C. § 1821(c) (1976). A GIFA is a Congressional-Executive agreement in
which Congress authorizes the Executive to enter into an international agreement on a subject which falls within Congress' constitutional authority. See Note, Congressional/Authorization and Oversight of International Fishery Agreements Under the Fishery Conservation and
Management Act of 1976, 52 WASH. L. REv. 495 (1977).
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GIFA's. 358 The prerequisite for the creation of a GIFA is that the
foreign nation acknowledge the exclusive fishery management au-

thority of the United States. The recognition of this authority entails a binding commitment on the part of the foreign nation to

abide by all regulations the United States deems necessary for the
implementation of any fishery management plan.35 9 Of paramount
importance is that a GIFA requires that any foreign nation a party
to the agreement is "not to harvest an amount of fish which exceeds
such nation's allocation of the total allowable level of foreign fishing",360 and this total allowable catch shall be determined each year,

by the United States Government. 36 1 Thus, in any given season,
the United States has complete discretion to set the level of foreign
fishing at zero, thereby completely excluding foreign fishing fleets,
while still being in complete compliance with the GIFA. By its

terms, the renunciation, practically speaking, of a GIFA, needs no
other legal basis for justification.
3. Rebus Sic Stantibus. Other broader bases of international
law also may be considered as possible justification for enforcing a

phase-out program when such a measure is enacted. Perhaps conditions will have so changed by that time, that the Vienna Convention Article 62 principle of rebus sic stantibus could be used to
withdraw from any existing fishing treaties to which the United

States may be a party. Then a claim of absolute jurisdiction over a
200-mile zone of fisheries could be justified by the fundamental in362 and independence. 363
ternational law principles of sovereignty
Even a sovereign, however, is bound by the rules of international
358. The only reciprocal fishing rights agreement of recent time that was not a GIFA was
the United States-Mexico Fisheries Agreement, which entered into force on November 24,
1976. The Agreement was to terminate on December 29, 1981. Mexico abrogated the treaty
on December 29, 1980. L.A. Times, Dec. 31, 1981, at 4, col. 1; San Diego Tribune, Dec. 30,
1980; see also L.A. Times, Feb. 11, 1981, § 3, at 4, col. 1.
359. 16 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(1) (1976).
360. Id. § 1821(c)(3). See notes 221-25 supra, and accompanying text.
361. See, e.g., the provision printed in Article VI, § 1 of the United States-Japan GIFA.
362. Sovereignty is defined as legal independence. In the context of theology and the
constitutional theory of the unitary State, sovereignty means omnipotence. G.
SCHWARZENBERGER & E. BROWN, supra note 45, at 51, 567.
363. Independence was recognized by the P.C.I.J. as a fundamental principle of International Law in the Eastern Carelia case. P.C.I.J. Ser. B, No. 5, at 27 (1923). D. O'Connell
states that "independence as a legal term signifies only that a fully sovereign state enjoys as
much freedom of legal action internally and externally as the law allows . . ."(emphasis
added). He further states that "it is obviously antagonistic to the conception of international
law that a state in the name of independence can claim absolute jurisdiction even in its own
territory." D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 319-21 (1965).
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law.3 ' Furthermore, the right of absolute fisheries jurisdiction, to
the extent of closing off that resource to other nations, has not yet
been realized. Even in the event a phase-out measure should find
justification in international law, it would not likely prevent retaliation by foreign nations dismayed at their exclusion from important
fishing grounds.
When the FCMA was enacted in 1976, the immediate response
of foreign nations fishing extensively within 200 miles of the United
States' coast was to protest this extension of fishery jurisdiction.3 65
These protests were soon followed by a large number of countries
enacting their own 200-mile fishery zones.36 6 There seems to be no
question that the response to a mandatory phase-out of foreign fishing in the United States' 200-mile FCZ would be similar to that of
the FCMA.36 7 If a large number of nations were to enact programs
resulting in the eventual exclusion of foreign fishing in their 200mile zones, the results could be disasterous. If 200-mile claims
were asserted world-wide, thirty-six per cent of the earth's oceans
and ninety per cent of the world's fisheries would be reduced to the
exclusive jurisdiction of coastal States. 368 The exclusion of foreign
fishing fleets from these zones, through the enactment of a phaseout program, by all coastal States would result in a closing of ninety
per cent of the world's fisheries to all but the coastal States' fleets,
resulting in severe hardship to the United States' fishing industry as
well as those of other nations. In the light of the many consequences of a unilateral action to phase-out mandatorily foreign
fishing, it may be wise for the United States to examine alternatives
before enacting such a measure.
D. Alternatives to a Mandatory Phase-Out
As discussed, the FCMA contains its own phase-out mechanism that would effectively exclude foreign fishing fleets from
United States waters in the event the United States fishing industry
is able to harvest the full optimum yield of a given fish stock. It
364. Id.
365. See MANAGING THE SEAS RESOURCES, supra note 145, at 88. See also Comment,
37 LA. L. REV. 852, 865 (1977).
366. Within two years after the passage of the FCMA, 86 other countries followed suit
and asserted claims to the living resources off their coasts. Many of these were developed
countries. Canada, Mexico, Norway, the European Economic Community and the Soviet
Union all enacted their own 200-mile fishing zones in 1976, less than a year after the United
States claimed exclusive jurisdiction over a 200-mile fishing zone on January 28, 1976.
367. House Report, supra note 3, at 71. See Wall St. J., Sept. 24, 1980, at 12, col. 1.
368. Krueger & Nordquist, supra note 58, at 322.
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appears that the disappointments in the development of the United
States fishing industry and conservation of fish stocks are due not
so much to the failure of the conceptual workings of the FCMA but
rather to the lack of effective implementation and enforcement of
its provisions. As Senator Magnuson, principle draftsman of the
FCMA stated: "[Tlhe tools for truly effective management are
there."3' 69 Therefore, before such drastic measures as a categorical
phase-out of foreign fishing are taken, various ways to strengthen
the FCMA should be explored.
In order to function more effectively the FCMA must be rigorously enforced. Such enforcement not only demands more funding
to increase the manpower. now available for enforcement but also
using that manpower in more effective enforcement programs.
More of the cost of enforcing the FCMA can be shifted to foreign
fishermen by imposing increased fees on them. Such fees can be
imposed in an equitable manner allowing different fees in different
fisheries according to which fisheries can best bear the cost.370 A
program of full observer coverage 37 ' could be instituted, supported
by the revenue from the increased fees. The observers could be
stationed on ships in those fisheries where the greatest problems of
overfishing occur.3 72
More funds and energy could also be devoted to fishery management science and research and development. It may be necessary to determine what the social, political and economic factors
are that go into formulating the optimum yield standard.3 73 At
present, the criteria for judging the optimum yield as defined by the
FCMA are vague. 37 4 The heart of the FCMA's fishery management philosophy is optimum yield and it must be clearly defined
and set in order to accomplish the objectives of the Act.
Finally, efforts should continue to be made for international
cooperation and improved access for United States fish products to
369. Magnuson, supra note 137, at 427.
370. House Report, supra note 3, at 36. Note that the Promotion Act, supra note 18,
§ 232, amends the permit fee provisions of the FCMA. The amendment provides that "[t]he
fees imposed. . . shall be at least in an amount sufficient to return to the United States an
16
amount which bears to the total cost of carrying out the provisions of this Act ....

U.S.C. § 1824(b)(10).
371. See note 230 supra. Note that the Promotion Act, id. § 236, adds provisions for a
full observer coverage program to § 1821 of the FCMA.
372. House Report, supra note 3, at 54.
373. See notes 248-54 supra.
374. Anderson & Wilson, Economic Dimensions of Fees and Access Control Under the
Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 52 WASH. L. REV. 701, 728 (1977).
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foreign markets through the elimination of trade barriers. Such
market access is crucial to the development of the United States
fishing industry. 7 5 Through such bodies as the United Nations, the
United States must also seek to develop a comprehensive Law of
the Sea treaty with clearly defined fishery provisions regulating foreign access. 376
IV.

CONCLUSION

The FCMA was enacted in 1976 in response to the increasing
over-exploitation of fishery resources off the coast of the United
States.3 7 7 It established a comprehensive plan for the conservation
and management of fisheries to prevent overfishing and protect the
interests of the United States fishing industry.3 7 8 More than four
years after its enactment, the FCMA has failed to regulate sufficiently the amount of foreign fishing off the shores of the United
States. A complete mandatory phase-out of foreign fishing has
been proposed as a solution to the problem.
Legislation was introduced on April 15, 1980, in which a
mandatory phase-out program would be put into effect that would
eventually reduce the level of foreign fishing in United States waters to zero.3 79 The Bill received much positive response, passing
the United States House of Representatives in September of
1980.380 The Bill that was finally enacted into law, however, did
not contain the mandatory phase-out provision. Nonetheless, it is
likely that the continuation of events leading up to the Bill proposing a mandatory phase-out, economic necessity and the prevailing
disenchantment with the status quo of the fishing industry under
the FCMA will again lead to the introduction of a similar bill.
It is questionable whether there is a need for a complete
mandatory phase-out of foreign fishing since the FCMA already
contains its own phase-out provision conditioned on the United
States' catch.3 at When this fact is combined with the possible viola375. House Report, supra note 3, at 30.
376. At this time the Law of the Sea negotiations are at an impasse since the Reagan
Administration has decided to forestall the conclusion of an acceptable Law of the Sea
treaty. See L.A. Times, Ap. 15, 1981, § 1, at 2, col. 1; L.A. Times, Aug. 7, 1981, § 1, at 2, col.
2; N.Y. Times, Mar. 4, 1981, at 1, col. 5. For a statement of some of the Reagan Admsinitration's objections to the LOS treaty see 81 DEP'T STATE BULL. 48 (1981).
377. See notes 139-46 supra, and accompanying text.
378. See notes 166-79 supra, and accompanying text.
379. See notes 16-17 & 261-67 supra, and accompanying text.
380. See note 18 supra, and accompanying text.
381. See note 258 supra, and accompanying text.
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tions of international law, a mandatory phase-out looks even more
unattractive. Two major treaties - the High Seas Convention and
the Fishing Convention - produced at UNCLOS I would be
breached if the United States were to enact such a measure.38 2 A
consequence of such breach would be a violation of the international legal rule of pacta sunt servanda.3 83 Since under the provisions of a phase-out measure the terms of these treaties could no
longer be honored, the effect would be a unilateral termination by
the United States.3 84 Unilateral termination may be justified, if
there has been a fundamental change of circumstances, under the
legal rule of rebus sic stantibus, as embodied in Article 62 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.3 85 In the light of the
Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, economic necessity and depletion of
United States' fishery resources may be insufficient to constitute the
necessary fundamental change in circumstances needed to justify
unilateral termination legally under Article 62 of the Vienna Convention.38 6
Developing customary international law may also be violated
by a mandatory phase-out measure.38 7 Evidence of such law is
found in the Draft Convention of UNCLOS III. The United States
would be in violation of Articles 61, 62, 87, 92 and 110 of that Convention.38 8 The United States' bilateral reciprocal fishing agreements, known as GIFAs may, by their provisions, be terminated if
the United States so desires. Thus, no other legal justification is
necessary.38 9 Another major drawback of a unilateral action to
phase-out foreign fishing is adverse foreign reaction. Foreign nations may enact their own phase-out programs in retaliation, adversely affecting the United States' fishing industry by closing off
important fishing grounds. Finally, considering the consequences
of such unilateral action, it may be in the best interests of the
United States to provide increased enforcement for and refinement
of the FCMA in order to achieve more fully their desired objectives, rather than to exclude categorically foreign fishing fleets.
Gary M. Shinaver
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